The transatlantic security architecture built after the Second World War was founded upon the military capacity of the United States (US), its nuclear deterrence, and its leadership within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Europe’s security was shaped in line with a continent-centered perception of threat, Washington acted as both the military guarantor and the political leader of this order. Throughout the Cold War, this structure focused on containing the “Soviet threat.” Even after the end of the Cold War, it remained largely intact, with European security continuing to be defined through the US military presence on the continent and NATO’S collective defense capacity.
However, structural transformations have begun to reshape the international system in the twenty-first century. China’s emergence as the long-term strategic and systemic rival of the US through its economic, technological, and military capacity,[i] has shifted the centre of gravity of American foreign policy from the Euro-Atlantic axis toward the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the Russia-Ukraine War has made clear that the possibility of conventional war in Europe has not disappeared. When the Gaza War, Iran-centred regional tensions, instability along the Syria-Iraq line, and security risks in the Red Sea affecting maritime trade and global supply chains are added to this picture, it becomes evident that Washington is compelled to manage multilayered crises across different geographies simultaneously.
This situation forces the US not only to balance China and contain Russia, but also to formulate policies capable of sustaining its global leadership capacity effectively and simultaneously across different geopolitical basins. Yet the US has learned from the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan that such policies should not be shaped along the lines of direct military intervention. Today, rather than providing security directly through its own military presence, the US is developing a more flexible and lower-cost security model in which responsibility is shared with regional partners in certain geographies. Of course, this does not mean that the US is withdrawing is completely from Europe. On the contrary, within this model, Washington is redefining European security through strategic partnerships it establishes in the surrounding basins.
During the Cold War, Europe’s security was shaped along the European and Atlantic axis. Today, however, the containment of Russia in the Black Sea, the security of energy and transport corridors in the South Caucasus, and the management of risks related to migration, terrorism, or Iran in the Middle East have become complementary components of European security. Therefore, Europe should not treat the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean as separate and independent security areas. At the same time, it is important for Europe to take into account with which regional partners the US will be cooperate, and through what kind of frameworks this cooperation will be established.
Indeed, the changing US security approach does not assign the same role to every regional partner. Instead, it brings different partners to the forefront in the subregions of the geopolitical belt that it increasingly treats as a single security space. For instance, Poland plays a critical role in strengthening deterrence against Russia on NATO’s eastern flank;[ii] Romania plays an important role in enhancing security on the western coast of the Black Sea;[iii] and Azerbaijan assumes a critical function in Europe’s energy supply security and in the development of Caspian-centred transport networks.[iv] However, each of these actors is effective within a specific geopolitical basin. Türkiye, by contrast, stands out as a regional partner capable of connecting different security basins due to its geographic position.
From Washington’s perspective, Türkiye’s increasing strategic value does not stem solely from its geographical location. The essential determining parameter is Türkiye’s capacity to produce simultaneous policies across different crisis areas that directly affect European security. The implementation of the Montreux regime and the preservation of maritime security in the Black Sea, mediation initiatives carried out during the Russia-Ukraine War, Türkiye’s military role on the southern flank of the Alliance as NATO’s second-largest army, the management of the transition process in Syria, maritime security in the Eastern Mediterranean, normalization processes in the South Caucasus, and the strengthening of the Middle Corridor, which has become one of the main alternatives within Europe’s energy diversification strategy, all position Türkiye as a security actor across this wider geography.
Moreover, the strengthening leader diplomacy between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump is moving US-Türkiye relations from a crisis-oriented framework toward an axis of pragmatic cooperation, despite the unresolved structural problems in bilateral relations.[v] Likewise, Donald Trump’s simultaneous appointment of US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack as Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq may be regarded,[vi] as an indication of Washington’s search for closer cooperation with Ankara in the conduct of its regional policies. Taken together, these developments indicate that the main dynamic of Türkiye-US relations is being shaped by the changing needs of regional geopolitics, and that as Washington’s approach to European security evolves, relations with Türkiye will become an important determining factor in the construction of the new security architecture.
At this point, an increasingly visible mismatch between US policy and the European Union’s security policy draws attention. On the one hand, after the Russia-Ukraine War, Brussels defines the Black Sea as one of the front lines of European security; supports alternative connectivity projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor, which aim to reduce dependence on Russian energy; advocates strengthening NATO’s southern flank; and evaluates migration and terrorism risks originating from the Middle East among the priority issues of European security.[vii] On the other hand, the EU appears to prefer keeping Türkiye outside new initiatives aimed at strengthening the European defense industry, such as the Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 and Security Action for Europe (SAFE).[viii] This reveals a deepening contradiction between the EU’s security needs and its political preferences.
In essence, this contradiction stems not so much from how Europe positions Türkiye, but from the insufficient analysis of how, and by what methods, the US is reconstructing European security. Debates in Europe mostly focus on the quantitative dimensions of transatlantic relations, such as the number of US troops on the continent, Washington’s contribution to defense spending, or the level of its political commitment to NATO. Yet the transformation in the quality of the US security approach is evident. Washington is shaping Europe’s security not only through its military presence on the continent, but also through cooperation networks it establishes with regional partners in the wider security environment. Türkiye stands out in this new order both as an important NATO ally and as a strategic partner capable of establishing military, diplomatic and geoeconomic links between different geopolitical basins.
Therefore, at a time when Washington is reconstructing the provision of security through regional partners, it would not be compatible with realpolitik for Europe to continue building its security planning on outdated transatlantic assumptions. In particular, Europe needs to accurately assess the impact that convergence or divergence along the Washington-Ankara line may have on European security policy. Strategic alignment or disagreement between Washington and Ankara may either expand or restrict Europe’s room for manoeuvre in each of the regions that affect the continent’s security. For example, stronger strategic alignment between Washington and Ankara could strengthen NATO’s deterrence capacity in the Black Sea and restrict Russia’s room for manoeuvre. It could also contribute to a more stable transition process in Syria and reduce irregular migration pressure toward Europe. Similarly, US support for Türkiye’s role in the security and sustainability of routes such as the Southern Gas Corridor, TANAP, the Caspian-Anatolian line, and the Middle Corridor could contribute to Europe’s strategy of developing alternative supply chains to Russia. Conversely, rising tensions in bilateral relations could increase the costs of implementing many policies, from Europe’s defense planning and energy security to transport networks and migration management.
For this reason, Brussels should not regard US-Türkiye relations merely as a foreign policy development that needs to be closely monitored. From the European perspective, the pragmatic approach would be to recognize the direction and consequences of US-Türkiye relations as one of the fundamental variables of European security policy, and to develop policy instruments that align the new security dynamics taking shape along this line with the objective of strategic autonomy. In this context, instead of pursuing policies that exclude Türkiye, Brussels should approach the development of cooperation mechanisms with Türkiye in areas such as the Black Sea, energy security, defense, migration management, and regional crises as a requirement of its own security needs. Such an approach could contribute to strengthening Europe’s security capacity on the hand, while preventing Europe from remaining outside the new security architecture taking shape along the Ankara-Washington line on the other.
In conclusion, from Europe’s perspective, the essential issue is not merely China’s status as a systemic rival or the threat posed by Russia. Rather, it is Europe’s ability to correctly read the new security approach developed by the US in response to these two challenges and to adapt its own security planning to this transformation. In this process, Türkiye’s strategic function represents a structural reality produced by the changing security architecture. Therefore, Brussels needs to take US-Türkiye relations into account as one of the fundamental parameters of European security planning. Otherwise, Europe may turn from being one of the actors shaping the changing security order into an actor merely adapting to the consequences of that order.
[i] “National Security Strategy”, The Washington House, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf, (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
[ii] “Increasing the US Military Presence in Poland”, Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland, https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/increasing-the-us-military-presence-in-poland, (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
[iii] Mehmet Ali Güller, “ABD’nin Karadeniz ve Romanya Planı”, CGTN Türk, https://www.cgtnturk.com/abdnin-karadeniz-ve-romanya-plani, (Date Accessed:22.06.2026).
[iv] Ilyas Babayev, “Highlight 38/2025: Azerbaijan’s Strategic Role İn Ensuring Europe’s Energy Security: A Reliable Partner İn Times Of Crisis?”, Master Of Advanced Studıes
European And Internatıonal Governance, https://www.meig.ch/highlight-38-2025-azerbaijans-strategic-role-in-ensuring-europes-energy-security-a-reliable-partner-in-times-of-crisis/, (Date Accessed:22.06.2026).
[v] “Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44000, (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
[vi] Gamze Bal, “ABD neden Tom Barrack’ı Irak’ta görevlendirdi?”, Tercüman Gazetesi, https://www.tercuman.com/analiz/abd-neden-tom-barracki-irakta-gorevlendirdi-3006, (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
[vii] “A Strategıc Compass For Securıty And Defence”, The European External Action Service, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf, (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
[viii] Güven Özalp, “AB’nin Savunma Fonu SAFE İçin Verdiği Süre Doldu: Türkiye İçin Süreç Bitti Mi?”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c79x8zqvr3xo , (Date Accessed: 22.06.2026).
