The declaration signed at the Kremlin on 12 November 2025 by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Vladimir Putin, which elevated relations between the two countries to the level of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Alliance,” appears at first glance to confirm the thesis that Astana is positioned within a Moscow-centered sphere of influence.[i] However, when this interpretation is evaluated together with the fact that Tokayev’s visit took place immediately after he had signed 29 agreements worth approximately 17 billion dollars with Donald Trump’s administration in Washington a few days earlier, it is significantly weakened.[ii] This simultaneity indicates that Russia’s Kazakhstan policy cannot be read as a one-directional relationship of domination.
Russia’s influence over Kazakhstan is based not on an abstract concept of influence, but rather on concrete infrastructure-based and capital-based relations of dependency. Today, more than eleven thousand joint ventures operate between the two economies, while large-scale Russian companies such as Rosatom, Gazprom, Lukoil and Sberbank are deeply integrated into the Kazakh economy. As of 2024, the bilateral trade volume reached approximately 30 billion dollars.[iii]
The area in which this dependency is most clearly manifested is energy export corridors. Approximately eighty percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are carried to global markets through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which transports oil extracted from the Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak fields to the port of Novorossiysk on Russian territory. This route corresponds to approximately forty percent of the country’s export revenues.[iv] This geographical dependency also determines the material limits of Astana’s discourse of strategic autonomy; for Kazakhstan to carry out large-scale oil exports while bypassing Russia would require either the expansion of capacity toward China or the construction of a technically highly challenging trans-Caspian undersea pipeline. The prevailing assessment in the relevant literature is that the second option is not feasible in the foreseeable future.
This structural dependency occasionally provides Moscow with an implicit instrument of pressure. The repeated disruptions experienced by the CPC since 2022 for various reasons, in some cases technical, in others due to judicial decisions, have continuously brought Kazakh officials’ demands for the diversification of export routes onto the agenda.[v] Nevertheless, the reciprocal nature of this leverage should not be overlooked. According to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, a complete shutdown of the CPC would create an annual cost of approximately 600-650 million dollars for Russia, while it would cause a loss of approximately 27 billion dollars for Astana and the Western energy companies operating on the ground.[vi] Paradoxically, this clear asymmetry contributes to the maintenance of stability through the high value that the pipeline holds for both sides.
Tokayev’s call for assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) during the social unrest that occurred in Kazakhstan in January 2022, and the brief deployment of Russian-led troops, were interpreted by many observers as proof of Astana’s security dependency on Moscow. Yet the following three-year period revealed that this assessment remained incomplete. Indeed, only a few months after the intervention, Tokayev openly refused to take Russia’s side in the Ukraine Crisis at a forum attended by Putin.[vii]
This position reveals the basic orientation of Kazakh foreign policy: maintaining cooperation with Moscow in the fields of security and economy while carefully avoiding granting legitimacy to Russia’s revisionism. According to an important assessment, under Tokayev, Astana has increasingly begun to perceive Moscow not as an ally, but rather as a potential threat; this perception has taken concrete form in steps such as strengthening defense capacity and intensifying diplomatic contacts with Western actors.[viii] More broadly, it may be argued that Russia’s Ukraine Crisis has eroded Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet space and expanded Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver. The fact that Astana’s multi-vector policy has become an increasing source of discomfort for the Kremlin also gains meaning in this context.[ix]
Analyzing Russia’s policy solely through the Moscow axis is methodologically insufficient; for the consequences produced by this policy largely depend on the strategic framework within which Astana evaluates these moves. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, institutionalized since the 1990s, a strategy of avoiding dependence on any single actor by maintaining balanced relations with Russia, China, the United States and Europe, has turned under Tokayev into a sharper and more calculated instrument of risk hedging.[x]
At this point, academic findings are noteworthy. A quantitative study examining Kazakhstan’s voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly concludes that the country’s foreign policy position overlaps most strongly with China and least strongly with the United States, while Russia, officially described as a “key ally,” is not the decisive primary vector.[xi] ndeed, China is currently Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner. When the United States vector, which gained momentum throughout 2025 through critical minerals and investment diplomacy; the European Union vector, through the Trans-Caspian transport corridor; and the Türkiye vector, through defense and education cooperation within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, are added to this picture, it can be observed that Moscow’s position in Astana’s eyes has evolved from that of a “primary patron” into “one of many strategic pillars.”.[xii]
The alliance declaration of November 2025 should also be evaluated within this framework. As relevant analyses accurately emphasize, the document does not replace the multi-vector policy; on the contrary, it reaffirms the Russian pillar of that policy. For Moscow, the declaration represents a symbolic gain showing that Russia is not isolated internationally, while for Astana, it functions as a balancing instrument that reassures Russia while preserving flexibility for openings toward the United States, China and Europe. The diplomatic practice of a leader who visited both Washington and Moscow within the same week should be read not as allegiance, but rather as a conscious search for equidistance.
Nevertheless, the assumption that the current balance is permanent should be approached with analytical caution. The success of the multi-vector strategy depends on a specific conjuncture in which great-power competition provides Kazakhstan with room for maneuver, and this conjuncture is open to change. If the Ukraine Crisis comes to an end, it is anticipated that Russia will redirect its attention to its near abroad and show a tendency to tighten its ties with its neighbors once again. Moreover, in an international environment in which the United States has begun to position Russia as a balancing element against China, the possibility that Astana’s strategy of balancing Moscow by leaning on the West may unexpectedly lose ground should be taken into account.[xiii]
Contrary to what is often assumed, it would not be accurate to characterize Russia’s Kazakhstan policy as a one-directional project of domination. This policy should be understood as a relationship of interaction that is constantly reshaped by Astana’s resistance, flexibility and calculated concessions. Moscow seeks to keep Kazakhstan within its orbit through economic interconnectedness and geographical imperatives; Kazakhstan, rather than breaking this dependency, prefers to dilute it by adding new vectors.
Within this framework, the Kazakhstan case constitutes a noteworthy example of the strategic choices of small and medium-sized states in an environment of great-power competition: a model of continuously negotiated autonomy within the sphere of influence of a powerful neighbor, achieved neither through direct confrontation nor through submission. Yet insofar as the sustainability of this model remains dependent on variables beyond Astana’s control, this balancing strategy is structurally fragile as much as it is an example of success.
[i] “Kazakhstan, Russia Sign Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Declaration”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-russia-sign-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-declaration/, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[ii] “Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 — Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/opinion-multi-vectorism-2-0-kazakhstan-seeks-balance-in-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape/, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[iii] “Kazakhstan at the Crossroads: Between Russia’s Grip and a Multi-Vector Future”, Caspian Post, https://caspianpost.com/opinion/kazakhstan-at-the-crossroads-between-russia-s-grip-and-a-multi-vector-future, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[iv] “Ukraine Risks Alienating Allies With Oil Infrastructure Attacks”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/12/russia-caspian-oil-strike, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[v] “Kazakhstan Faces Multi-Million Losses—Is the Azerbaijani Route the Solution?”, Caspian Post, https://caspianpost.com/energy/kazakhstan-faces-multi-million-losses-is-the-azerbaijani-route-the-solution, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[vi] “Ukraine Risks Alienating Allies With Oil Infrastructure Attacks”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/12/russia-caspian-oil-strike, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[vii] “Kazakhstan Reinforces Multivector Foreign Policy”, The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/kazakhstan-reinforces-multivector-foreign-policy/, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[viii] Same source.
[ix] “Kazakhstan at the Crossroads: Between Russia’s Grip and a Multi-Vector Future”, a.g.e, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[x] Nurbolat Nyshanbayev, Kairat Bekov, Zhulduz Baizakova ve Alipbayev Amangeldy, “The Republic of Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy”, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2336825X241308432, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[xi] R.A. Yuneman, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy”, Russia in Global Affairs, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/kazakhstan-multi-vector/, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[xii] “Kazakhstan’s Diplomacy in 2025: Year of Strategic Recalibration”, The Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2026/01/kazakhstans-diplomacy-in-2025-year-of-strategic-recalibration/, (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
[xiii] “Kazakhstan at the Crossroads: Between Russia’s Grip and a Multi-Vector Future”, a.g.e., (Date Accessed: 29.06.2026).
