The economic security roadmap, energy resilience, artificial intelligence cooperation, and the first joint defense development agreement announced after the talks between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi may initially be interpreted as a strengthening of bilateral economic relations. However, considering Japan’s other steps and historical context, this agreement points to a broader strategic transformation.[i] At the heart of this shift is the increasing geopolitical power dynamics of critical minerals within the international system.
Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper, and rare earth elements have become essential inputs for a broad technological ecosystem, ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to semiconductors, defense systems, data centers, and artificial intelligence infrastructure. According to the International Energy Agency, lithium demand is projected to increase by approximately 30 percent in 2024, while demand for nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements is expected to rise by 6-8 percent.[ii] This table shows that critical minerals have become essential components not only of the clean energy transition, but also of advanced technology and the defense economy. Therefore, critical minerals are considered a new area of energy security today.
Just as oil and natural gas were of strategic importance in the 20th century in terms of industrial capacity and military mobility, critical minerals are playing a similar role in the 21st century in terms of battery production, high-tech industries, defense systems, and digital infrastructure. Therefore, access to these minerals cannot be interpreted as a market-dependent supply problem; it can be seen as a security issue directly linked to the technological sovereignty, industrial resilience, and strategic autonomy of states.
This issue is not new to Japan. Tokyo has experienced critical mineral vulnerability earlier than many Western actors. News of restrictions on rare earth element exports following tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2010 demonstrated to Japanese decision-makers that critical minerals could be used as a diplomatic leverage tool.[iii] Similarly, the possibility of China restricting the supply of certain heavy rare earth elements and other strategic materials to Japan for months in May 2026 reveals that the vulnerability Tokyo experienced in 2010 continues to this day.[iv]
This historical experience forms the backdrop to Japan’s current strategy. While Japan is dependent on external sources for energy and natural resources, it possesses high value-added production capacity in automotive, electronics, semiconductor equipment, robotics, artificial intelligence, and defense technologies. Therefore, the biggest security problem for Tokyo is the possibility of disruptions to the energy, mineral, and technology supply chains that sustain this production capacity. In other words, Japan’s strategic vulnerability stems from the gap between its lack of natural resources and its high-tech production capacity.
The recent agreements signed with India can be seen as Japan’s strategy to reduce its dependence on China, positioning India as an alternative production, technology, and supply partner. In this way, India’s growing industrial capacity, expertise in software and artificial intelligence, and its pursuit of access to critical minerals are becoming an important link in Tokyo’s economic safety net.
Japan’s strategy is not limited to India. In March 2026, the US and Japan announced an action plan in the field of energy projects and critical minerals; this plan aimed to reduce dependence on China, discuss price floor mechanisms for critical minerals, and support projects in areas such as nickel, gallium, lithium, fluorite, and rare earth recycling.[v] In May 2026, Australia and Japan deepened their cooperation in the field of critical minerals; the two countries committed approximately $1.2 billion in support to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities in mining, refining and manufacturing processes.[vi] The QUAD mechanism is also being added to this table. The critical minerals initiative, announced in May 2026 within the framework of QUAD, which consists of India, Japan, the USA, and Australia, aims for member countries to act together in the areas of mining, processing, recycling, and investment coordination.[vii] Thus, Japan is not only making bilateral agreements; it is also creating a multi-layered economic security network that complements each other through the US, Australia, India, and the Quadrilateral Agreement.
This network strategy provides Japan with three significant advantages in the international system. First, Tokyo can diversify its supply chains, reducing its dependence on China. Second, through partnerships in critical minerals, it is not merely a buyer but is taking a more active role in processing, investment, technology, and production. Third, Japan gains the capacity to build alliances in the field of economic security, beyond classical military deterrence. This strengthens Japan’s goal of becoming not merely an ally operating under the US security umbrella in the Indo-Pacific, but a founding actor in the economic security architecture.
In conclusion, the India-Japan agreements demonstrate that critical minerals have become one of the new geostrategic arenas of competition in the international system, and that Tokyo is attempting to manage this competition through economic security networks rather than military alliances. Japan’s multi-layered network, established through the US, Australia, and India, signals a new era in the Indo-Pacific where security is shaped not only by navies, bases, or defense spending, but also by access to critical minerals, supply chain resilience, and joint production capacity.
[i] “India, Japan sign pacts on AI, metals and energy after Modi-Takaichi talks”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-japan-sign-pacts-boost-cooperation-ai-metals-energy-2026-07-02/, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[ii] “Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025: Executive Summary”, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/executive-summary, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[iii] “China bans rare earth exports to Japan after row-NYT”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/commodities/china-bans-rare-earth-exports-to-japan-after-row-nyt-idUSSGE68M051/ (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[iv] Solomon Cefai, “China squeezes Japan over rare earths in repeat of 2010 showdown”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-squeezes-japan-over-rare-earths-repeat-2010-showdown-2026-05-22/, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[v] “Japan, US announce energy projects, critical minerals action plan”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japan-us-announce-energy-projects-critical-minerals-action-plan-2026-03-19/, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[vi] “Australia, Japan strengthen critical minerals ties”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-japan-strengthen-critical-minerals-ties-2026-05-04/, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
[vii] Michael Martina, Saurabh Sharma ve John Geddie, “Australia-India-Japan-US Quad to build a port, unveil pact on minerals and energy security”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/australia-india-japan-us-quad-seeks-relevance-foreign-ministers-meet-new-delhi-2026-05-26/, (Date of Access: 02.07.2026).
