The political order of Eurasia has been shaped by a dense network of regional organizations that emerged largely under the influence of Russia and China, and function today as strategic instruments reflecting their power. Two of these organizations occupy a central position: the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both structures go beyond mere economic or security policy cooperation, serving to symbolically and normatively establish an independent Eurasian order distinct from Western models. Russia and China pursue different strategies in this regard, which are partly complementary and partly competitive. While Russia focuses on security policy control and political loyalty, China pursues an economic approach geared toward infrastructure, trade, and pragmatic network building.
The EAEU is a product of Russia’s efforts to establish hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Its aim is to economically bind the former Soviet republics to Moscow, counter the influence of Western institutions such as the EU and NATO, and establish a new order under Russian leadership. The SCO, on the other hand, emerged from a multilateral security dialogue that initially focused on resolving border disputes after the collapse of the Soviet Union and later evolved into a comprehensive security and economic policy forum. In this organization, Russia and China nominally act as equal partners, but in practice have different priorities. China uses this organization to ensure regional stability in its western border regions and to secure its development initiatives, while Russia uses it as a stage to demonstrate its role as a major power and to support its concept of a multipolar world order.
Both organizations reflect the character of the regional structure. Although these regimes support regional integration at the rhetorical level, they are reluctant to transfer their sovereignty rights to supranational institutions. This situation results in a distinct form of intergovernmentalism that weakens multilateral decision-making mechanisms and prioritizes bilateral negotiations. Consequently, institutional structures such as the Eurasian Economic Commission, the permanent executive body of the EAEU, and the regional counter-terrorism units of the SCO have limited implementation capacity. Many decisions taken within these institutions remain largely symbolic in practice. The primacy of regime stability over joint policy development efforts weakens political integration at the regional level.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have developed different models of regional cooperation. China’s approach is essentially pragmatic and based on economic considerations. Beijing aims to expand its economic presence in Eurasia through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to establish a comprehensive transnational infrastructure network for this purpose. In contrast, Russia tends to act through selective institutionalization and bilateral agreements, aiming to consolidate its geopolitical leadership in the post-Soviet space with this strategy. In this context, the EAEU not only serves economic integration but also acts as a buffer against Western spheres of influence. However, China’s growing economic dynamism and global economic network are increasingly limiting Moscow’s room for maneuver in the region and placing the relationship between the two actors under structural tension. This asymmetric balance of power shapes the fundamental dynamics of the regional order in Eurasia and limits the long-term sustainability of joint ventures.
The SCO serves as the most important forum for coordinating security policies between Russia and China. The organization’s agenda focuses on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism—the so-called “three evils”—and ensuring regime stability in Central Asian states. At the same time, the SCO also offers a normative alternative to Western-centric security architectures. The organization is based on principles such as non-interference in internal affairs, respect for state sovereignty, and the preservation of cultural diversity. With this orientation, the SCO functions as a forum that prioritizes state control and regime stability rather than political openness. Therefore, the organization stands out not only as a security policy actor but also as an ideological carrier of a state-centered understanding of order.
At the same time, the internal structure of the SCO is shaped by various differences as well. Although the participation of India and Pakistan in the organization has expanded its geopolitical reach, it has also brought with it historical lines of conflict, making it difficult for the organization to develop a consistent strategic orientation. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, pursue a multidimensional foreign policy that considers not only Russia and China but also their Western partners. Their membership in the SCO is therefore selective and tactical in nature, as this forum allows them to increase their international visibility without permanently aligning themselves with any of the major powers.
Within the context of China’s BRI, the SCO serves two primary functions. On the one hand, it stabilizes the security environment necessary for China’s infrastructure projects, while on the other hand, it offers Moscow the opportunity to participate in the region’s economic restructuring process. However, the power balance between the two actors remains asymmetrical. While China assumes the role of economic engine and financier, Russia stands out more with its political and military regulatory function. This division of labor, which appeared complementary in the 2010s, has gradually turned into implicit competition, especially since China began to enter the traditional Russian sphere of influence by expanding cooperation in the field of security policy.
Officially established in 2015, the EAEU represents Russia’s most ambitious initiative to build a new regional order in the post-Soviet era. The foundation of the Union is a customs union aimed at removing trade barriers between member states and creating a common economic area. Russia is the dominant economic power within the Union. It produces approximately 90 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and uses this position to establish control mechanisms in the field of foreign policy. In contrast, smaller members such as Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan view the Union primarily as a means of economic gain, particularly privileged access to the Russian market. These differing expectations undermine the political coherence of the EAEU, and despite the existence of supranational institutions, the decision-making process continues to rely heavily on intergovernmental interactions. The decisions of the EAEU Court of Justice are often ignored, with national interests taking precedence over collective rules.
Russia’s tendency to use the EAEU as a strategic foreign policy tool is also clearly evident in its international stance. Moscow is attempting to increase the Union’s international visibility and position it as a counterbalancing factor against Western-centric structures by signing free trade agreements with third countries such as Vietnam, Serbia, and Iran. This “soft hegemony” policy allows Russia to secure its influence without applying direct control mechanisms. However, the Union remains at a limited level of economic integration. Intra-Union trade accounts for only a small portion of Russia’s total foreign trade, with the bulk of exports still directed toward the European Union and Chinese markets.
The geopolitical competition between Moscow and Beijing is pushing Central Asian states into an ambivalent position. These states are seeking to take advantage of the competition between the major powers to obtain financial aid, investments, and security guarantees, while at the same time their dependence on both Russia and China is increasing. Therefore, their foreign policies are based on a careful balancing act centered around the goal of preserving strategic autonomy. In this context, Türkiye stands out as an actor that is increasing its influence in the region through cultural and linguistic ties and is gaining importance, particularly in the South Caucasus. Ultimately, a multipolar power arena is emerging in Eurasia, where economic, normative, and security policy models compete simultaneously.
Despite their institutional weaknesses, the AEB and SCO play a central regulatory role in the regional order. These institutions provide Russia and China with platforms where they can both coordinate their interests and promote their alternative approaches to governance. These “functional arrangements” are characterized by flexibility; while avoiding deep integration, they promote stability through contract-based interdependencies and institutional routines. Both countries view these mechanisms as complementary elements of a multipolar world order that aims to limit the influence of Western institutions. While Russia emphasizes its role as a guarantor state in security policy, China seeks to consolidate its long-term global leadership position by using its economic ties.
This institutional structure has led to the emergence of a hybrid form of regionalism that does not fully conform to either classical integration processes or the Western liberal order. This configuration is based on pragmatic cooperation among members that prioritizes common interests such as stability, regime security, and territorial integrity over normative or democratic values. The result is a type of “integration” model in which political legitimacy derives from control mechanisms based on economic efficiency and security rather than social participation.
The long-term sustainability of this order remains uncertain. With economic balances favoring China and security dimensions favoring Russia, structural asymmetry harbors tensions that could deepen with increasing competition. However, the involvement of external actors such as the European Union, the United States, and Türkiye in the region through initiatives such as Global Gateway or the C5+1 format creates new dynamics that challenge the existing balance. Nevertheless, the Eurasian experience shows that the balance of power between Russia and China, limited institutional integration, and normative homogeneity have the capacity to create stable yet flexible forms of cooperation.
In general, Eurasia has emerged as a laboratory where alternative models of order are being tested, with states attempting to link sovereignty, stability, and development without adopting liberal principles. Both the SCO and the EAEU function as the main platforms where Russia and China test the foundations of a non-Western regional order. This order is characterized by an ambivalence that, in one sense, creates institutional stability and limited potential for cooperation, while in another sense reproduces power asymmetries and normative conflicts. Therefore, Eurasia is neither fully integrated nor completely fragmented; rather, it presents a fluid regional network where cooperation and competition are intertwined, shaped by overlapping interests.
