Guinea-Bissau, the most strategic yet deeply fragile gateway of West Africa to the Atlantic Ocean, witnessed one of the most complex and multilayered military interventions in its political history on Wednesday, 26 November 2025. The process, which began with President Umaro Sissoco Embaló’s statement “I have been overthrown”[i] and was muddled by the opposition’s response calling the incident “a theatrical performance,” [ii] evolved into a different dimension when a group led by General Horta N’tam, calling itself the High Military Command for the Restoration of Order, seized power. What has unfolded resembles a hybrid structure that looks less like a classic coup and more like a multi-actor simulation of power.
Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974, the concept of stability has remained almost a mere wish for this country, which has witnessed successful coups in 1980, 1998, 2003, 2009, and 2012, alongside more than seven attempted uprisings. The military continues its longstanding tradition of preferring to patrol the corridors of the presidential palace rather than their barracks. The current crisis, which erupted immediately after the presidential elections held on Sunday, 23 November 2025, an election in which both sides declared victory before the results were even announced, can be read as yet another manifestation of the country’s deeply ingrained habit of shaping politics through the barrel of a gun.
Although the Embaló era began with the promise of relative stability, his tendencies toward authoritarianism and his efforts to render parliament dysfunctional have narrowed the space for civilian politics. This suggests that his close relationship with France may have created a serious legitimacy crisis among nationalist officers and Pan-Africanist opposition groups. It is evident that the catalyst for the crisis was the 23 November election: the fact that both President Embaló and the main opposition leader, Fernando Dias, proclaimed victory before the official results from the Election Commission pushed the political atmosphere into an irreversible tension.
The military’s move on 26 November, one day before the official results were expected on Thursday, 27 November, is highly significant in terms of timing. Two main scenarios collide here: the military may have acted to prevent the dismantling of the Embaló regime, anticipating a Fernando Dias victory at the polls; or conversely, the intervention may have been aimed at preventing Embaló from plunging the country into chaos. The suspension of the electoral process and the closure of borders reinforce the interpretation that the will of the ballot box has been vetoed by military tutelage.
The “Auto-Coup” theory voiced by opposition leader Fernando Dias represents the darkest possible scenario. [iii]According to this theory, once Embaló realized he had lost the election, he may have planned to create chaos through loyal officers, suspend the constitutional order, and maintain power under the pretext of a national security crisis, rather than stepping down peacefully. Yet, the flow of events suggests that this theory evolved in a different direction on the ground.
Embaló’s announcement that he had been arrested and his subsequent departure to Senegal[iv] indicate that either the plan spiraled out of his control or the military decided to pursue its own agenda. Even if the armed forces initially cooperated with Embaló, they may have chosen to sacrifice him once he became a burden, turning what might have been a controlled-chaos strategy into an uncontrolled purge. When analyzing Guinea-Bissau, ignoring the cocaine trade, which exceeds the country’s GDP, would mean overlooking the most critical component of the equation.
As a transit hub for cocaine trafficked from Latin America to Europe, the country has long been one of the most vivid examples of a “Narco-State” in the literature, with the military acting as the backbone of logistics, security, and distribution. The High Military Command’s reference in its coup declaration to a “destabilization plot involving a drug baron” contains, in fact, an implicit confession. The military may be attempting to reorganize the distribution of drug revenues within civilian politics, or to purge rival cartels’ extensions within the state.
Reports indicating record levels of drug trafficking during the Embaló era show that although the “cake” has grown, the struggle over its distribution has intensified. In this context, the coup can be interpreted less as a political correction and more as a commercial seizure operation. By exploiting the weaknesses of civilian governance, the military elite may be attempting to become the sole authority over narco-trafficking, eliminating intermediaries and channeling profits directly into the armed structure.
Beyond these internal dynamics, the developments in Guinea-Bissau may be seen as the latest episode in France’s declining influence in West Africa. Embaló was one of Paris’s last loyal allies in the region, and his removal or forced exile represents a strategic defeat for France. Following Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the loss of Guinea-Bissau from the French orbit would mark a significant setback for France along the Atlantic coast. Russia’s position, however, requires a more nuanced analysis.
Although there is no concrete evidence that Moscow, known for its interest in bauxite and phosphate resources, planned this coup, Russia has demonstrated skill in turning existing crises to its advantage through a strategy of creative disruption. Wagner, or its rebranded form Africa Corps, is highly likely to establish contact with the new military rulers and provide “security consultancy.” If the junta seeks to resist pressure from the West, it may inevitably turn toward Moscow.
Russia may find an opportunity within this power vacuum to secure a port with direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, a potential strategic nightmare for both Africa and NATO’s southern flank. Meanwhile, the regional organization ECOWAS appears to have lost its deterrence in preventing or reversing coups. The ineffective sanctions seen in Niger and Mali may have emboldened Guinea-Bissau’s military.
Senegal’s position is especially critical. As a bordering state affected directly by separatist tensions in the Casamance region, Senegal stands to suffer most from Embaló’s downfall. Embaló’s flight to Senegal suggests that Dakar is acting as a mediator or safe haven; yet given Senegal’s domestic political dynamics, a military intervention seems unlikely. Under current circumstances, it is probable that General Horta N’tam and his team will postpone elections indefinitely under a so-called “transition period” and govern the country through decrees.
To break its international isolation, the new junta may rapidly seek rapprochement with Russia—making the sight of Russian vessels in the Port of Bissau far from surprising. Moreover, if the coup was not carried out with full military consensus, internal conflict may arise among lower-ranking officers or excluded factions over disputes in drug-revenue distribution.
In conclusion, the events of 26 November in Guinea-Bissau were not merely a change of power but the seizure of the state apparatus by an organized structure. This structure, a hybrid organism combining the military hierarchy with the operational networks of drug cartels, has reduced political parties, elections, and constitutional institutions to decorative elements that exist only at its discretion. The theory that Embaló engineered his own coup and the reality of the military’s takeover paradoxically complement one another: while Embaló may have intended to muddy the waters, the military has proven far more adept at navigating them. At this point, the people of Guinea-Bissau find themselves trapped between democratic uncertainty and military certainty.
History has once again shown that in this region, the certainty of the gun barrel invariably triumphs over the uncertainty of the ballot box. When the world looks at Guinea-Bissau, it witnesses not merely turmoil in a small African country, but the construction of a 21st-century “failed state” prototype where global power rivalries, transnational criminal networks, and local struggles for dominance intersect. What is truly alarming is the possibility that this prototype is no longer an exception in West Africa, but is gradually becoming the new norm
[i] “Guinée-Bissau : le président Embaló arrêté, des militaires disent « prendre le contrôle total du pays »”, Jeune Afrique, 26 Kasım 2025, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1743734/politique/guinee-bissau-umaro-sissoco-embalo-se-dit-victime-dun-coup-detat/, (Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
[ii] “Guinea-Bissau opposition accuses president of faking coup to retain power”, Africa News, 27 Kasım 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/11/27/guinea-bissau-opposition-accuses-president-of-faking-coup-to-retain-power/, (Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
[iii] “Guinea-Bissau names Embaló’s ally interim head, intensifying speculation of an ‘arranged coup’”, Business Insider Africa, 27 Kasım 2025, https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/guinea-bissau-names-embalos-ally-interim-head-intensifying-speculation-of-an-arranged/12t3fhb,(Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
[iv] “Coup d’Etat en Guinée-Bissau : Embaló exfiltré vers le Sénégal”, Apa News, 27 Kasım 2025, https://fr.apanews.net/news/coup-detat-en-guinee-bissau-embalo-exfiltre-vers-le-senegal/, (Date Accessed: 28.11.2025).
