The demonstrations organized by Western-backed non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which gathered in front of the Parliament building in Tbilisi during the evening hours of November 2025, reflect a contracted and routinized civil mobility rather than the broad-participation and heated opposition rallies of previous years. In this process, where EU and NATO flags are waved with the discipline of a “regular job” under police supervision, the pulse of the street remains controlled; meanwhile, the actual rupture in the political arena is occurring as the Georgian Dream (GD) government rejects the one-way geopolitical engagement imposed by the West in favor of a search for “multi-vector diplomacy.”
Indeed, although NGOs characterize this move by the GD government as a “geopolitical suicide” that closes the country’s European route, the ruling wing interprets this situation as a reflex to protect state sovereignty against radical pro-Westernism and unchecked NGO activities. Even though Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s announcement on November 28, 2024, that they had removed EU accession negotiations from the agenda was criticized by the opposition as a violation of Article 78 of the Constitution and a “Putinist turn,”[i] for the GD, this decision constitutes a strategic declaration of sovereignty taken as a result of the conflict between national values and the agenda presented by Brussels under the guise of issues such as “human rights” and “NGO freedom.”
The government’s attempt to elevate relations with the West to a plane of “equals” and to limit interference in domestic affairs has led to the establishment of a harsh defensive line in diplomatic rhetoric. Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili, standing behind Prime Minister Kobakhidze’s decision, has articulated a manifesto of resistance based on “independence and honor” against the Brussels bureaucracy. Accusing European politicians of plotting a bloody “Maidan” scenario in Georgia, Papuashvili defined the ongoing protests as an “externally managed mechanism” and emphasized that the EU accession process cannot be used as a bludgeon of blackmail against a sovereign state. With the statement, “We will do everything for EU membership, but we will not beg the Brussels bureaucracy,”[ii] Papuashvili demonstrated the will to prepare for the GD’s 2030 vision on their own terms and out of necessity, declaring that they are pursuing a foreign policy that prioritizes national interests rather than submitting to Western impositions.
The most concrete manifestation of this struggle for sovereignty is observed in the diplomatic conflicts occurring over cultural values and domestic legal regulations. Parliament Speaker Papuashvili made harsh statements against German Ambassador Peter Fischer and the Brussels bureaucracy, likening the EU’s current management approach to an instrument of domination that crushes national interests, and issued a diplomatic ultimatum by stating, “The Fischer file is closed for us.” Arguing that the real crisis in relations stems from the LGBT+ policies imposed by the West within the framework of “human rights” and interventions regarding the “Law on Family Values,” Papuashvili stated that Brussels ignores Hungary’s sovereignty while following the political calculations of Estonia and the United Kingdom. Emphasizing that Georgia will not enter a similar bureaucratic tutelage after freeing itself from the Soviet yoke, the government accuses the EU of devolving into a “low-level” structure that disrespects national symbols such as Lasha Talakhadze, maintaining its determination to preserve the traditional structure of the state even at the cost of burning bridges with the West.[iii]
Although the state’s effort to ensure “internal control” and prevent externally sourced destabilization attempts is defined as a “regime of repression” by the opposition and the West, the GD administration views this as the establishment of public order. According to data included in the NGO statement; while practices such as the opening of criminal investigations against 160 people, the arrest of more than 600 individuals, and political monetary fines are characterized as an “iron fist”[iv] by opponents, in the eyes of the government, these steps are necessary measures for the protection of state authority. The fact that Western actors like British parliamentarian James MacCleary called on protesters to “fight” strengthens the Tbilisi administration’s “foreign intervention” thesis; meanwhile, opposition groups referencing the ideals of Ilia Chavchavadze continue to interpret this process as a transition to “Russian-style authoritarianism.”
The ruling power’s strategic preferences include not only tension with the West but also the construction of a pragmatic foreign policy that observes regional balances. Criticisms by Vika Pilpani, a member of the opposition “For Georgia” party, regarding the government deviating from the Western route through conscious choices,[v] and the activation of Western-sourced sanction regimes, are answered by the GD’s “geopolitical diversity” maneuver. When US and EU sanctions targeting the state elite, primarily Bidzina Ivanishvili, which intensified in the 2024-2025 period, combined with European Parliament decisions questioning the government’s legitimacy,[vi] the Tbilisi administration accelerated its search for new axes in order to break unilateral dependency.
Indeed, in the face of isolation moves such as the European Commission effectively freezing Georgia’s candidacy status and the Tbilisi administration not being invited to the Enlargement Forum; the high-level visit to China by the delegation led by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze summarizes the GD’s foreign policy vision. While the government tries to minimize regional risks by maintaining relations with Russia behind closed doors in a cautious and covert manner[vii]; it simultaneously aims to break the West’s diplomatic isolation by deepening relations with Beijing. This situation is read not merely as Georgia “shifting to the East,” but as it following a multi-vector survival strategy that prioritizes its own “national sovereignty” and “internal control” mechanisms without being squeezed between the Russia-China and Western axes.
When the current conjuncture and dynamics on the ground are projected, it is foreseen that the GD government will not step back from its insistence on “strategic autonomy” in the short and medium term, but on the contrary, will further harden internal fortifications against normative impositions from the West and NGO activities it views as hybrid intervention tools. It is highly probable that potential new waves of sanctions and diplomatic isolation moves from Western capitals will be mitigated thanks to the “silent diplomacy” Tbilisi conducts with Moscow and the “pragmatic protection shield” established through the deepening economic partnership with Beijing. In this equation, while the government’s rhetoric of “traditional values” and “anti-globalism” continues to consolidate the ground of legitimacy in domestic politics; the highest probability appears to be the evolution of relations with the EU from a normative membership perspective to a completely mutual interest-based, unemotional, and conditional “transactional” ground, and the prevention of the opposition on the street from forming a systemic threat by being marginalized against the state’s institutional capacity.
In the final analysis, the dampening of civil resistance on the streets of Tbilisi and its evolution into a “manageable routine” has opened space for the GD government to code the crisis experienced in relations with the West not as a “suicide” or rupture, but as the “registration of absolute sovereignty.” The Tbilisi administration, not stepping back in the face of normative impositions and sanction threats from Brussels and Washington; while legitimizing control over NGOs and the cultural sphere internally with the discourse of “state survival,” conveys the message externally that it is “not without alternatives” against the West by activating a pragmatic balance with Russia and a strategic partnership with China. This strategic equation documents that Georgia’s foreign policy has settled onto a new realpolitik plane that is stripped of emotion and completely based on interest, where national interests and non-interference in internal affairs are red lines, departing from the era of “unconditional integration.”
[i] “Arasamtavrobo Organizaciebi Kartvel Sazogadoebas Ar Surs Cxovreba Rusuli Avtoritarizmis Pirobebshi”, Interpressnews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/855943-arasamtavrobo-organizaciebi-kartvel-sazogadoebas-ar-surs-cxovreba-rusuli-avtoritarizmis-pirobebshi-chveni-eri-kvlav-dgas-damoukideblobis-girsebisa-da-evropuli-momavlis-sadarajoze, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[ii] “Evrokavshiris Cevrobistvis Qvelapers Gavaketebt Tumca Briuselis Biurokratias Matxovrobas”, Palitra Video, https://palitravideo.ge/video/184880-evrokavshiris-cevrobistvis-qvelapers-gavaketebt-tumca-briuselis-biurokratias-matxovrobas-ar-davucqebt-briuselis-biurokratias-ai-es-undoda-irakli-kobaxizis-28-noembris-gancxadebis-qvela-sitqvas-kidev-ertxel-vacert-xels-shalva-papuashvili/, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[iii] “Shalva Papuashvili Pishers Vetanxmebi Rom Misnairi Damokidebulebis Shemtxvevashi Rtuli Ikneba “, Interpressnews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/855927-shalva-papuashvili-pishers-vetanxmebi-rom-misnairi-damokidebulebis-shemtxvevashi-rtuli-ikneba-chveni-kavshiri-evropastan-batoni-pisheris-paili-chventvis-daxurulia, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[iv] James MacCleary, “We must support Georgians in their opposition to the Georgian Dream”, X, https://x.com/JamesMacCleary/status/1994400009627021320, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[v] Tamar Tabatadze, “For Georgia’s Pilpani: No signs GD wants real dialogue with Western partners”, 1TV, https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/for-georgias-pilpani-no-signs-gd-wants-real-dialogue-with-western-partners/, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[vi] “Sanctioned Georgian Dream Representatives”, Transparency International Georgia, https://transparency.ge/en/post/sanctioned-georgian-dream-representatives, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
[vii] “EU Leaves Out Georgian Dream From Enlargement Forum After Commission’s Critical Report”, Civil Georgia, https://civil.ge/archives/709989, (Access Date: 29.11.2025).
