The fact that Southeast Asian countries are heavily dependent on critical maritime straits such as the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz for energy and trade makes these economies extremely vulnerable, especially during times of crisis. The recent crisis centered on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Middle East has had a shock effect on Southeast Asian economies, raising energy and food prices, increasing transportation and insurance costs, and disrupting supply chains for fertilizers, medical supplies, and other critical products. This conflict has also exposed the weaknesses of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the field of diplomacy. ASEAN countries, aiming to remain outside of global competition, also seek to protect their own interests, demonstrate solidarity, resolve their internal problems, and thus resist external pressures in the face of competition from major powers.
In line with this diplomatic stance, also known as ASEAN centrism, member states prioritize regional cooperation when formulating their security and economic policies, aiming to minimize the negative impacts of global competition. However, small and medium-sized enterprises within ASEAN remain extremely vulnerable and passive in the face of global crises/shocks. In this context, instead of developing proactive (preventive) strategies, the states in the region often remain reactive, responding to the economic, social, and political security problems triggered by these crises. Far from achieving regionalization in the style of the European Union, Southeast Asian states struggle to develop coherent and cooperative policies among themselves in a number of critical sectors such as economy, energy, agriculture, and security. Furthermore, maritime disputes in the South China Sea make it difficult for the states in the region to come together, particularly in the area of security.
ASEAN countries import oil and other critical raw materials from the Middle East via the Strait of Malacca. More than 60,000 ships pass through this strait annually, carrying approximately one-third of global trade and over a quarter of global oil transported by sea. This immense volume makes Malacca not only an economic corridor but also one of the most sensitive geopolitical bottlenecks in global politics. The future of the Strait of Malacca bears significant structural similarities to the Strait of Hormuz, which is plagued by chronic insecurity in the Middle East. The asymmetric threats created by tensions between the US, Israel, and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated how navigational security can become a weapon during periods of military escalation. Sanctions, embargoes, or scenarios of closing the Strait of Hormuz could also emerge in the future for the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, which are at the center of great power competition (especially between the US and China).
Similarly, Iran and Oman’s attempts to control the Strait of Hormuz and impose transit fees on ships passing through it are also a subject of debate among countries bordering the Strait of Malacca, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.[i]Although Malaysian and Singaporean officials have rejected such an initiative, it is reported that the Indonesian government is seriously considering the idea of charging tolls for passage through the Strait of Malacca.[ii] Singapore, in particular, advocates for maintaining the “free and open” status of the strait. This diplomatic stance is based on the principle of freedom of transit under international maritime law, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any attempt to charge tolls for using the strait would not only create a regional rift but also open the door for global actors using the strait (the US, China, Japan, and the EU) to directly interfere in regional diplomacy. It seems quite difficult for ASEAN countries to reach a common view and stance regarding passage through the Strait of Malacca. The point of agreement is that the strait should not become a direct battleground in the US-China rivalry.
ASEAN’s passive and reactive stance during crises stems from its founding principle of “non-interference in internal affairs.” This principle prevents ASEAN countries from taking collective and swift action during crises. The principle of “non-interference in internal affairs,” to which Southeast Asian countries adhere strictly, makes it difficult for the organization to adopt a common stance in the face of humanitarian and political crises in the region. For instance, even though the coup that erupted in Myanmar in February 2021 directly threatened the stability and security of the entire region, ASEAN failed to develop active and effective policies to resolve this crisis, instead pursuing a reactive and exclusionary strategy, such as excluding Myanmar from meetings. ASEAN’s five-point solution proposal regarding Myanmar could not be implemented because it was extremely detached from realpolitik (the realities on the ground). Furthermore, the principle of seeking absolute “consensus” in decisions prevents collective and rapid action in asymmetric crisis situations. This diplomatic structure makes it impossible to implement deterrent sanctions in regional crises, transforming the organization into a passive entity that only manages crises rather than resolving them.
Ultimately, the latest wave of crises, originating in the Middle East and threatening the navigational security of the Strait of Hormuz, has created a sudden macroeconomic shock in Southeast Asia. This crisis has once again highlighted ASEAN’s institutional weaknesses, not only in its economic vulnerabilities but also in its ability to adopt a collective stance and conduct proactive crisis diplomacy in the face of complex global conflicts. The main threat for Southeast Asian countries is the possibility that asymmetric risks in the Strait of Hormuz could spread on a much larger scale through a domino effect to the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. In such a rupture, ASEAN countries would face not only the disruption of global supply chains but also the direct risk of their own maritime zones becoming geopolitical conflict zones. Therefore, ASEAN needs to develop much more proactive strategies to prevent potential crises from emerging and to develop common policies.
[i] Joshua Kurlantzick, “After Hormuz, Southeast Asia Sees the Potential Value of Tolling the Strait of Malacca”, CFR, https://www.cfr.org/articles/after-hormuz-southeast-asia-sees-the-potential-value-of-tolling-the-strait-of-malacca, (Date Accessed: 17.06.2026).
[ii] “‘Malaysia won’t be lectured’: Singapore’s refusal to negotiate over Hormuz creates waves”, SCMP, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3349464/malaysia-wont-be-lectured-singapores-refusal-negotiate-over-hormuz-creates-waves?module=top_story&pgtype=section, (Date Accessed: 17.06.2026).
