Since the Industrial Revolution, the demand for energy by governments has increased rapidly. Sectors such as glass, plastics, paper, cement, and especially iron and steel are defined as “energy-intensive industries” due to their high energy requirements. Globally, energy consumption is rising daily alongside population growth, urbanization, industrialization, and digitalization. Primarily the construction sector, along with the iron and steel-based defense industry and rapidly growing data centers, consume vast amounts of energy. The arms race, intensified by the weakening of global security, further increases the demand for energy.
Energy is one of the most critical elements of sustainable growth and development for modern states. A state that cannot ensure energy security is unable to guarantee its national and international security as well. The first half of the 21st century is described as the “century of crises.” Climate change associated with global warming, mass migration movements, food insecurity, cyber attacks, the Russia-Ukraine War, and the inability to prevent the massacres committed by the United States (US) and Israel in the Middle East are just a few of the fundamental crisis areas that today’s international system faces. In this multidimensional crisis environment, energy is sometimes used as an “end” and sometimes as a “means” in the rivalry among global actors.
In order to ensure energy security, the energy consumed must be supplied:
- From reliable sources and routes,
- Using clean technologies, without harming the environment,
- At a reasonable price based on international markets,
- With high storage capacity,
- By increasing diversity,
- Through sustainable and predictable policies.[i]
However, nowadays no country, including the US, the European Union (EU), Russia, China, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, has been able to fully guarantee its energy security. In the network of intertwined global relations, it does not seem possible to achieve a hundred percent security in the field of energy.
When energy security is considered in terms of supply and demand, energy-rich countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia combat threats within the scope of “supply security,” while energy-dependent countries such as the EU, China, and Türkiye face various threats on the axis of “demand security.”
The Ukrainian-based competition between Russia and the West and between Russia and the EU has historical roots dating back centuries. Russia, which views Ukraine as “its backyard,” has engaged in various economic and political initiatives since 2004 to increase its influence over the country. In response, the West has attempted to distance Ukraine from Russia under the pretext of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. In this competitive environment, Russia has briefly cut off the natural gas it transfers to the EU via Ukraine in 2006, 2009, and 2014; annexed Crimea in 2014; and supported separatists in the Donbas region. Eventually, on February 24, 2022, Russia has begun its invasion of Ukraine.
Before the war, the EU countries, lacking sufficient lessons from past energy crises, have continued to import approximately half of their natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia. Germany’s leadership in the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 projects, built under the Baltic Sea, is the most concrete manifestation of this dependence. Following the start of the war in 2022, these pipelines were blown up and the flow of gas to the EU via Ukraine was halted. Upon this, the EU has rapidly begun seeking alternative sources and routes.
According to the Eurostat data, in the second quarter of 2025, the EU continued to source 7.8% of its natural gas imports and 12.9% of its LNG imports from Russia. During the same period, 50.8% of the EU’s natural gas imports were supplied by Norway, and 57.7% of its LNG imports were provided by the US.[ii] According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the EU’s total gas imports from Russia have fallen from 45% in 2021 to 13% in 2025. At the same time, Russian coal imports have declined from 51% to zero, and oil imports from 26% to 2%.[iii]
The European Commission has also announced that LNG imports from Russia will be completely suspended on January 1, 2027, followed by the suspension of pipeline gas imports on October 1, 2027. However, landlocked countries such as Hungary and Slovakia are objecting to this decision, as their access to LNG is limited. Russia’s sale of gas to these countries at more favorable prices is also weakening political unity within the EU.
The EU imported a total of 52 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia in 2024, comprising 32 billion cubic meters of pipeline gas and 20 billion cubic meters of LNG, along with 13 million tons of crude oil and over 2,800 tons of enriched uranium.[iv] Despite this, the EU has made significant progress in the areas of energy efficiency and conservation during the conflict and has strengthened its investments in renewable energy. Nevertheless, it is also evident that there are limited options that can fully replace Russia in the short term.
An agreement worth $750 billion for LNG purchases between the EU and the US has been signed, covering the period until 2028. Between 2021 and 2024, the EU’s LNG imports from the US have increased by 139%, while total gas imports from Russia have decreased by 66%. During the same period, Norway’s gas exports to the EU have risen by 15%.[v]
Russia exports the energy products it cannot sell to the EU primarily to China and India at discounted prices. This situation reduces Russia’s revenues while providing China and India with significant advantages. The US and Norway are also the actors benefiting most from the gap in the EU market. In this context, from the perspective of energy, the greatest losers of the war are the EU and Russia; whereas the greatest winners are the US, China, and India. It is obvious that the definite loser is Ukraine, whose energy and infrastructure have been destroyed.
By reducing its dependence on Russia and turning to the US, the EU now faces the possibility of experiencing a similar dependency crisis with the US in the future. Consequently, the EU’s energy security is fraught with serious vulnerabilities both today and in the future.
The EU countries that opposed the NABUCCO project, which was planned to pass through the Caspian-Türkiye-Europe routes between 2002 and 2010, are now facing the negative consequences of their decisions. The EU’s failure to update its Customs Union, from which it derives significant strategic advantages through Türkiye, and its continued pursuit of unilateral gains will pave the way for new crises similar to the NABUCCO project in the future.
[i] Özalp Mustafa, 2025, Dünyanın Yenilenebilir Enerji Görünümü Ve Geleceği, Akademik Hassasiyetler, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 28, 649-681.
[ii] “Wie viel Gas bezieht die EU noch aus Russland?”, Statista, https://shorturl.at/QZfpi, (Access Date: 05.12.2025).
[iii] Şeker Ata Ufuk, “AB, Rusya’dan gaz alımını 2027’de sona erdirecek”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/ab-rusyadan-gaz-alimini-2027de-sona-erdirecek/3760812, (Access Date: 05.12.2025).
[iv] “Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports”, European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0440R(01), (Access Date: 05.12.2025).
[v] “EU Exchanges Russian Gas for American & Norwegian Supplies”, Statista, https://shorturl.at/w2Dmn, (Access Date: 05.12.2025).
