The recent toughening of the European Union’s (EU) migration policies is closely linked to both the rise of security-oriented trends in the political atmosphere within the Union and the institutional reorganization of the long-standing burden-sharing problems among member states. In particular, the rise of far-right tendencies since the 2015 crisis, the strengthening of internal security concerns, consistent low return rates, and the failure of member states to achieve success through previous mechanisms based on voluntary solidarity have pushed the EU towards a more centralized and rule-based migration management model. In this context, the new EU Migration and Asylum Pact, which will come into force in 2026, establishes a tougher regime based on accelerated asylum procedures at the border, faster rejection of applications from high-risk countries, strengthening of the EU’s external borders with military-technical capacity, and tightening of readmission mechanisms. This transformation directly affects the current architecture of Türkiye’s migration relationship with the EU, leading both to a redefinition of the March 18 Agreement and a narrowing of Türkiye’s capacity to use migration as a foreign policy instrument.
The EU’s increasingly stringent approach to migration is essentially based on three key strategic axes: First, halting migration flows before they reach the EU’s borders; second, managing the burden of asylum within the EU in a controlled manner; and third, establishing a solidarity system based on financial compensation rather than a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism among member states. Within this framework, the Solidarity Mechanism aims to redistribute the migration load within the EU by requiring member states that do not accept refugees to pay approximately €20,000 per person. However, the implementation of this central strategy is not independent from the internal dynamics of the EU. The Solidarity Mechanism is seen as a violation of sovereignty in countries such as Poland and Hungary and encounters serious political resistance. Furthermore, accelerated border procedures and the expansion of the notion of safe third countries have the potential to become the subject of significant legal struggles before the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. These internal conflicts and judicial scrutiny may delay or alter the full and timely implementation of the Pact.
This mechanism, while increasing solidarity within the EU, does not result in a reduction of the burden on Türkiye; on the contrary, it increases the pressure on Türkiye from its external border countries, particularly Greece and Bulgaria, to push back and rapidly return migrants, thanks to new EU-supported migration control capacities. When combined with Türkiye’s more systematic classification as a safe third country, this situation suggests that the EU will be more inclined to reject asylum applications more easily and send applicants back to Türkiye. However, this trend is not absolute. Although the broadening of the safe third country classification of Türkiye appears to reflect an intention to establish a de facto collective return regime, Türkiye’s geographical reservation prevents it from providing full protection to refugees from outside Europe, and some of its practices in the field of human rights may give rise to serious objections and judicial obstacles under international law (1951 Geneva Convention) and the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 3. This legal resistance is an important factor that could curb the EU’s practice of easier return. However, what matters here is how effective this will be, i.e., how much the EU will actually comply with its own legal order and human rights standards.
Türkiye’s position in this new architecture is acquiring the quality of an external partner that shoulders a burden, rather than a buffer zone for the EU. The externalization of migration by the EU is transforming Türkiye into an actor that bears more responsibility but has a limited say in decision-making mechanisms. In this regard, the EU’s externalization strategy is not limited to Türkiye. Similar “hybrid” agreements are being sought with other transit countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. This situation may, in the long term, weaken Türkiye’s unrivaled position to some extent or give the EU the opportunity to diversify its bargaining strategy. In this sense, although there is a probability that the EU will increase its financial support and technical assistance, it is clear that Türkiye will actually assume a greater administrative, legal, and socioeconomic load. This increased burden, combined with internal political problems such as the management of the approximately four million refugees currently hosted by Türkiye, intensifying local pressures, and weakening social acceptance dynamics, is narrowing Ankara’s room for maneuver. Paradoxically, the EU’s tougher policies and emphasis on return could also have a legitimizing effect on pro-return rhetoric and policies in Türkiye’s domestic politics. In other words, while Türkiye’s capacity to use migration as an instrument in foreign policy is diminishing, the perception of external approval or necessity for practices in this area in domestic politics may strengthen.
The impact of the EU’s tougher migration policy on Türkiye-EU relations signals a broader strategic shift that is not solely limited to security and humanitarian dimensions. While migration currently continues to function as a bargaining chip between the two sides, the EU’s increasingly security-focused approach is likely to narrow this area of negotiation. If this trend continues, it can be expected that positive agenda items, such as visa liberalization, the updating of the Customs Union, and the revitalization of high-level political dialogue mechanisms, which Türkiye has long kept on the agenda, will be pushed further into the background. This is because the EU is moving towards institutionalizing a security architecture that is more protectionist internally and based on pushing risks beyond its borders externally in the face of increasing migration pressure. This may create a structural incompatibility with Türkiye’s expectations for cooperation. In this context, the future of the March 18 Agreement is also growing increasingly uncertain.
The procedures and financing instruments offered by the new EU Migration and Asylum Pact may create a tendency to render the agreement ineffective or dissolve it within a broader legal-political framework without the need to renegotiate it. In such a scenario, even if the agreement retains its symbolic and political significance as a reference document between the two parties, it may be overshadowed operationally by the mechanisms of the pact. This tendency could reduce Türkiye’s negotiating capacity vis-a-vis the EU, limiting both the usability of migration in foreign policy and the possibilities for achieving positive agendas such as visa liberalization and the updating of the Customs Union.
Nevertheless, Türkiye remains an indispensable partner for the EU due to its geopolitical position, its decisive role in controlling irregular migration flows to the EU, and its current hosting of a vast refugee population. Türkiye’s migration and protection policies, conducted with full compliance to the framework of international law, constitute one of the practical cornerstones of the EU’s externalization strategy, while also making the necessity for the EU to remain faithful to its own commitments more visible. In this respect, fulfilling pledges such as advancing the visa liberalization process, updating the Customs Union, and ensuring that financial support mechanisms operate in a transparent, predictable, and sustainable manner is critical for the partnership to continue on an egalitarian and trust-based foundation. Otherwise, the widening gap between the EU’s unilateral security-oriented approach and the humanitarian, economic, and political burden borne by Türkiye will both weaken the sustainability of cooperation and lead to migration management drifting apart from the basis of common interests.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the EU’s toughening of its migration rules is pushing Türkiye—a country that already hosts a very large refugee population and de facto contributes to the protection of the EU’s external borders—into a position where it bears the heavy responsibilities of the system but is excluded from the Union’s internal solidarity mechanisms. This new architecture, while facilitating burden sharing within the EU, paradoxically increases the burden on non-EU partners such as Türkiye. Türkiye maintains its position as an indispensable partner for the EU due to its geographical location and existing humanitarian responsibilities, but the sustainability of this partnership appears to depend on the EU’s ability to concretize its commitments to Türkiye. In this context, Türkiye’s migration management remains not only a humanitarian necessity but also a strategic area that determines the overall trajectory of relations with the EU. Therefore, the fair sharing of the burden assumed by Türkiye and cooperation based on reciprocity are important from a legal, political, and ethical standpoint. While strengthening its own internal solidarity mechanisms, the EU is expected not to neglect its responsibilities towards external partners. It would be a sound strategy for Türkiye to continue this cooperation in line with its international obligations while preserving its current capacity. Otherwise, the resulting asymmetric structure could render Türkiye an implementer of the EU’s increasingly stringent migration regime, yet a limited actor in the decision-making processes.
