The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, have not only limited their effects to the energy geopolitics of the Middle East; they have also reopened discussions on the external trade architecture of landlocked states that are geographically distant from the region but indirectly dependent on it due to transit. Central Asian republics, which are self-sufficient in oil and natural gas production, have shown vulnerability in terms of access security to open seas rather than energy supply security during this crisis. The crisis in question has rendered the southern route, which the region has considered relatively reliable for decades, inoperative, while paradoxically creating a new route option thru the land corridors activated along the Pakistan-Iran border.
For landlocked states, the structural priority of foreign policy is to minimize dependence on a single transit country by increasing the routes that reach open seas. In the case of Central Asia, this strategy has operated thru four main options: east via China, west via Russia, the Caspian route, and the southern route extending to the ports of Iran and Pakistan. The concern of avoiding asymmetric dependence on Beijing and Moscow has systematically directed the regional states toward the southern route. The preference for Iranian ports within this route is not coincidental. Chabahar and Bandar Abbas have offered a relatively predictable transit regime for Central Asian cargo, more developed land and rail connections, and specific commercial conditions for exporters. These characteristics are noteworthy in that they demonstrate that predictability and institutional stability are more decisive than cost in the selection of transit routes.
In contrast, the Pakistan routes harbor chronic structural disadvantages. This route is plagued by the need to overcome unstable Afghanistan and Pakistan’s internal corridors vulnerable to militant activities, as well as inadequate connectivity infrastructure, uneven trade regimes, and poorly managed ports. Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan over the past two years, particularly the military operations conducted in February 2026, have further eroded the reliability of the routes passing thru Afghanistan. Therefore, the Hormuz Crisis has been added to an already fragile transit balance.
The closure of the Strait has effectively halted maritime trade directed toward Iranian ports; ships expected to dock in Chabahar and Bandar Abbas have redirected to Pakistani ports located outside the Strait of Hormuz. The report in April that more than three thousand containers destined for Iran were piling up at the port of Karachi reveals the quantitative dimension of this shift. This blockage has necessitated the rapid implementation of a connectivity framework that has existed on paper since 2008 but has not been put into practice. The transit decision implemented by Pakistan on April 25, following Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad from April 24-26, allowed the passage of goods from third countries to Iran via Pakistan and made six land corridors connecting the ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim to Iran’s Gabd and Taftan border crossings operational. The Gwadar port, which handled approximately 8,300 containers throughout 2025, processed 11,000 containers in just a few weeks in April 2026, indicating not only the speed of the transformation but also Iran’s trade shifting toward Pakistan’s infrastructure.
The impact of this route shift on Central Asia is twofold. On one hand, the collapse of the Iran route means the loss of the transit gateway that the region considers the most reliable. On the other hand, the new corridors provide a flexibility that was previously unavailable: Central Asian cargo can be unloaded at Pakistani ports and transported by land to the Iranian border without having to traverse the unstable internal routes of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and from there, it can be integrated into the region via Iran’s relatively developed transportation network. Kyrgyzstan’s consideration of the Karakoram route thru China to bypass Afghanistan, along with similar pursuits by other republics, indicates that the vision of a “southern route without Afghanistan” is increasingly becoming a policy priority.
However, whether this option constitutes a true salvation largely depends on variables beyond Central Asia’s control. Resolving the structural management issues at Pakistan’s three major ports and ensuring the safety of cargo transportation to the border despite security vulnerabilities in Balochistan is a prerequisite for the sustainability of the corridors. The more decisive variable lies on the Iranian side: the extent of the damage caused by US and Israeli attacks on Iran’s land and railroad infrastructure and the capability of this infrastructure to meet additional cargo capacity remains uncertain. As long as these uncertainties persist, it is expected that the leaders of Central Asian states will evaluate the new route cautiously.
This framework makes the structural dilemma of Central Asia visible. The southern route adopted to avoid dependence on China and Russia has itself become subject to regional instability. The shadow cast over the Iran route by a war and the Pakistan route by both increasing interdependence with Iran and its own internal security vulnerabilities reveals that route diversification, in most cases, redistributes rather than eliminates risk. New corridors make Central Asia more dependent on Iran’s stability and the course of Pakistan-Iran relations than before.
In this process, it should be emphasized that the main strategic gain belongs primarily to Pakistan, not Central Asia. The redirection of Iranian trade, paralyzed by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, toward Pakistani ports and land routes has elevated Islamabad to the dominant position in the bilateral relationship. The Central Asian republics, once again, have to adapt to the outcomes of an equation they did not determine.
The activation of the Pakistan-Iran land corridors presents a theoretically valuable option for Central Asia; the possibility of bypassing Afghanistan, the revitalization of the idle Gwadar Port, and the added flexibility to the southern route are positive aspects in this regard. However, the viability of this option depends on conditions that regional capitals cannot control alone (Pakistan’s port and security reforms, the post-war resilience of Iran’s infrastructure, and the overall trajectory of regional stability). The Hormuz Crisis has reaffirmed that for landlocked states, access to the sea is not only an infrastructure issue but also a geopolitical vulnerability dependent on the decisions of external actors. The structural lesson to be drawn from the region is that the cost of excessive dependence on any single route (south or east) is ultimately always determined externally.
