Japan has long been known as a state that foregrounded its economic power while avoiding an assertive role in the military sphere. The constitutional order shaped after the Second World War and the strong pacifist tendencies within society restricted the country’s security policy for decades. However, over time, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region has changed significantly. Today, China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear capacity, Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, and transformations in the United States’ global strategy are forcing Japan to redefine its understanding of security.
The military buildup Japan is currently undertaking carries far more meaning than merely increasing defense capacity. This process can also be evaluated as an attempt to redefine the country’s role in the international system.
The Changing Regional Threat Perception in Japan’s Security Strategy
At the center of the change in Japan’s security strategy is, first and foremost, China. Over nearly the last twenty years, China has transformed its economic size into military capacity and has achieved remarkable developments, especially in the field of naval power. Beijing’s activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are perceived by Tokyo not merely as a regional struggle for influence, but as a direct security problem.
In this context, Japan’s annual defense reports refer increasingly to China’s military activities with each passing year. Moreover, these reports emphasize the importance of being able to respond to new-generation forms of warfare in which artificial intelligence and unmanned aerial vehicles are used. In addition, they state that the capacity to sustain long-term conflicts must be developed and that the defense production and technology infrastructure must be strengthened.[i] Another important issue for Japanese decision-makers is Taiwan. The Tokyo administration argues that a possible crisis in Taiwan would directly concern Japan.
North Korea also occupies an important place in Japan’s security calculations. Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs have increased the threat perception of the Japanese public and strengthened political support for raising defense expenditures. Russia’s attack on Ukraine, meanwhile, has created a critical turning point in Japanese strategic thought. Tokyo has once again faced the reality that great powers in the international system may seek to change borders through the use of force.
From Defense to Deterrence: The Lasting Impact of the Abe Transformation
Japan’s security policy had long been based on defense. Theoretically, the country was not supposed to possess offensive capacity. Today, however, this approach is changing. Tokyo is now developing capabilities not only to respond to an attack, but also, when necessary, to strike the source of the threat. The noteworthy point is that Japan is developing this capacity not for the purpose of aggressive expansionism, but for deterrence.
Japan’s current geopolitical orientation is largely shaped in line with the strategic framework drawn by Shinzo Abe. Thus, if one had to focus on a single political figure in order to understand Japan’s current military buildup and more assertive foreign policy, that figure would undoubtedly be Shinzo Abe. Much of the strategy pursued by the current government under the leadership of Sanae Takaichi is a continuation of the steps taken during Abe’s premiership.
One of the most important steps during the Abe government was the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The postwar constitution technically prohibited Japan from declaring war and maintaining military power for offensive purposes. However, the Abe administration accepted the principle of “collective self-defense” in 2014. At the press conference held after the Cabinet approved the change in the constitutional interpretation, Prime Minister Abe explained why it was necessary for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Abe used the words, “Japan will not enter into war for the purpose of defending another country.”[ii] He also stated that the strengthened alliance between Japan and the United States would increase deterrence and contribute to the preservation of peace and stability in the region. In addition, Abe stated that Japan would remain a country committed to peace in the future, as it had been in the past.[iii]
Another noteworthy move was the adoption of Japan’s first official National Security Strategy on 17 December 2013 by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first cabinet. This document formed the basis of the revised National Defense Program Guidelines, later renamed the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Term Defense Program, now known as the Defense Buildup Program. The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program are today accepted as Japan’s three fundamental security documents. Later, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s cabinet adopted comprehensive changes to the three security documents on 16 December 2022. The most fundamental reason for these updates was Russia’s launch of an attack on Ukraine that year.[iv]
The Institutional and Technological Deepening of Japan’s New Security Architecture
The Takaichi administration decided to bring forward the revision of the three security documents, which was initially planned for 2027. On the agenda are topics such as Japan’s counterstrike capability, integrated air and missile defense, the protection of the Pacific region and critical sea lanes, and the use of unmanned systems. In addition, the development of defense capacity in space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, the use of artificial intelligence in command and communications, and the strengthening of cooperation with like-minded countries are among the issues to be addressed. Lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine, especially new methods of warfare such as the combined use of missiles and unmanned systems, will provide an important background to these assessments. At the same time, strengthening Japan’s human resources, developing its technological infrastructure, and increasing its defense production capacity are also emerging as equally important issues.[v]
Another development worth mentioning is the passage by the Japanese Parliament, the Diet, of a law providing for the establishment of a national intelligence bureau. This step aims to strengthen the government’s intelligence capacity. According to the law, the intelligence bureau to be established will be authorized to comprehensively collect and analyze information among ministries and various institutions. It is also stated that a National Intelligence Council will be established within the Cabinet. The Prime Minister will chair this council; the council will consist of cabinet members holding relevant portfolios, especially the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[vi] The government plans to put the bureau into operation as early as the summer of 2026. Committees in both the lower and upper houses of the Parliament adopted an additional resolution in order to ensure that personal information and privacy are not unnecessarily violated. The resolution also emphasizes that the government should not resort to methods of information collection that could damage political neutrality.[vii]
In addition, it has been reported, based on government sources, that the current government in Japan has begun preparations to create a new institution in order to support the defense industry. The new structure in question is planned to operate in a way that includes steps such as promoting the export of defense equipment. The institution is expected to be structured as an independent administrative agency that includes cooperation between the public and private sectors and coordination among different ministries.[viii] It is also stated that the government is considering creating a Japanese model similar to the United States’ Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In this system, the state is expected to act as a point of contact on behalf of companies in export processes and to support after-sales activities such as maintenance and training in customer countries. In addition, plans include providing financing to initiatives, nationalizing production lines as much as possible, and carrying out modernization efforts so that the industrial infrastructure can be made capable of rapidly adapting to emergencies.[ix]
Japan’s Multipolar Security and Regional Partnership Strategy
Japan’s foreign policy is still largely based on its alliance with the United States. However, the nature of the alliance is changing. During the Cold War, Japan’s security was largely ensured by American military power, while Japan was able to focus on economic development. Today, however, Washington expects its allies to assume greater responsibility. Moreover, the crisis that has emerged around Hormuz has led to a series of important geopolitical threats on a global scale, including energy security.
Tokyo is aware of this as well. For this reason, Japan is now trying to increase its own capacity instead of relying solely on the protection of the United States. It appears that the aim is not to replace the United States, but to become a stronger and more equal partner within the alliance. This situation increases Japan’s strategic autonomy while also making its relations with the United States more balanced.
Japan’s recent foreign policy is not solely centered on the United States. Tokyo attaches great importance to expanding its network of regional partnerships. Relations developed with Australia, India, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are part of this strategy. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim agreed to increase cooperation in the fields of energy and maritime security during their meeting in Tokyo on 10 June 2026. In a statement to journalists after the summit, Takaichi said that the talks also addressed the signing of a coast guard cooperation document aimed at ensuring safe and free navigation in regional waters in relation to the defense field.[x]
Malaysia is an important energy supplier for Japan, which is dependent on energy imports. For example, Malaysia supplies approximately 15 percent of Japan’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply. A large share of the crude oil going to Japan is also transported through the Strait of Malacca, a critical trade route between Malaysia and Indonesia. In the field of defense, the leaders confirmed the continuation of the implementation of Japan’s official security assistance program, which it has been carrying out since 2023 in order to support like-minded countries. It was stated that under this program, defense equipment such as rescue boats and surveillance drones has been provided to Malaysia.[xi]
In the context of the Strait of Malacca factor, Malaysia and Indonesia are becoming key actors in line with Tokyo’s foreign policy objectives. For China as well, crises that would emerge after any escalation in the strait would be unacceptable. Indeed, the preservation of stability and a secure environment in the Southeast Asian region is considered a unifying element for both Tokyo and Beijing.
Tokyo emphasizes the principle of regionalization in foreign policy. In this context, its developing relations with India are also noteworthy. It is observed that Japan and India are developing increasingly close strategic cooperation in the face of “China’s rise.” It can be said that the path Japan will follow in the coming period will largely depend on the course of the competition between China and the United States. If a softening occurs in relations with China, Japan may pursue a more balanced strategy and establish a new balance between economic cooperation and security policies. Although Japan avoids forming a direct bloc against China, it is trying to create a regional balance of power. The main purpose of this approach is to prevent any state from becoming the sole dominant power in the Asia-Pacific.
If regional tensions increase, Japan can be expected to further develop its military capacity. In particular, new investments may be seen in missile systems, artificial intelligence-supported defense technologies, and naval forces. However, regardless of which scenario takes place, it is clear that Japan will no longer remain merely an economic power. Today, Japan is transforming from the passive economic giant of the postwar period into a more active actor in security and geopolitical issues. At the center of this transformation are China’s rise, the Taiwan issue, the North Korean threat, and uncertainties regarding the future of the United States-led international order. For this reason, the new approach that has emerged can be summarized with the ancient Roman principle “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war). This understanding carries a tendency to form a pragmatic synthesis between traditional pacifism and realist security policy.
[i] “Japan’s defense report raises ‘serious concern’ over China’s military activities”, NHK WORLD–JAPAN, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260603_03/, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2026).
[ii] “Abe’s Moves Toward Collective Self-Defense”, Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00062/, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2026).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Chijiva Yasuaki, “Rethinking Japan’s National Defense: Takaichi Tackles the Three Security Documents”, Nippon.com, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01231/rethinking-japan%E2%80%99s-national-defense-takaichi-tackles-the-three-security-documents.html#, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2026).
[v] Ibid.
[vi] “Japan’s parliament passes bill to create national intelligence bureau”, NHK WORLD–JAPAN, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260527_12/, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2036).
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] “Government Planning New Defense Export Support Body”, The Japan News, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20260610-331881/, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2026).
[ix] Ibid.
[x] “Japan and Malaysia vow stronger energy, maritime security ties”, Kazinform, https://qazinform.com/news/japan-and-malaysia-vow-stronger-energy-maritime-security-ties-743dd3, (Date Accessed: 13.06.2026).
[xi] Ibid.
