Today’s complex landscape of international relations is confronted with multidimensional, interconnected crises, including global warming, climate change, energy crises, excessive militarization, irregular migration, cybersecurity threats, violations of international law, trade wars, and threats to the security of logistics hubs. The inability to halt the genocides committed by the United States (U.S.) and Israel in the Middle East, particularly Israel’s expansionism, demonstrates the existence of a significant power vacuum in the world. On the other hand, the growing prevalence of deviant beliefs, such as those targeting the extinction of the human race (e.g., LGBT ideologies), not only erodes social values but also leads to the corruption of the concept of family. When analyzed collectively, all these developments indicate that humanity has entered a new historical era that could be described as the “century of crises.”
In this process, it is evident that the Western-centric international order established under U.S. leadership following World War II has entered a serious phase of erosion. The unipolar system that emerged in the post-Cold War era is weakening. Within this framework, political, economic, military, technological, and geopolitical power centers are shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, a new multipolar international order is taking shape. In short, it is evident that U.S.-centered Western hegemony is entering a process of disintegration, losing power day by day, and that new power centers centered on China are beginning to rise in its place.
The U.S. failure in the “War on Iran” against China and Russia is accelerating the collapse of American hegemony. This is because the U.S. losing the power struggle centered on Iran will lead to a significant weakening of U.S. influence along the broad geopolitical and logistical corridors stretching from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea, southern Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. In other words, this situation would lead to a decline in U.S. strategic influence over Eurasia, the Middle East, and critical global trade routes. In such a scenario, it is assessed that the U.S.’s global influence capacity could become largely confined to the American continent and be drawn into a narrower geopolitical sphere centered on Latin America.
The United States’ withdrawal from more than 60 international organizations operating under the United Nations (UN), the growing inadequacy of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in resolving international crises, China’s rapid expansion of its economic and technological capabilities, and Russia’s maintenance of its power based on energy reserves and military capabilities, all indicate that significant transformations are taking place in the international system. Furthermore, since the early 2000s, the growing visibility and influence of mid-sized regional actors such as Turkey, India, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil within the international system highlight significant shifts in global and regional power balances. When all these developments are considered together, it becomes evident that the world is facing significant uncertainty and unpredictability, and that shifts in global hegemony are taking place.
The war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, tensions centered on Taiwan and Kashmir, energy wars, and global trade competition are accelerating new geopolitical fractures within the international system. These developments demonstrate that a multidimensional and intense power struggle is unfolding on a global scale—not only in the military sphere but also in the realms of energy, technology, finance, logistics hubs, and trade corridors. In this context, Turkey is not merely a regional actor. On its path to becoming a global actor, Turkey occupies a central geopolitical position situated between Europe, Asia, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Turkestan. Turkey’s geographical location, its influence over energy transit routes, its developing defense industry, its logistics capacity, and its multifaceted foreign policy experience all possess the potential to position it as one of the central countries in the new international system. Aware of its capabilities, geopolitical strength, and strategic capacity, Turkey has the potential to make significant contributions to “world peace” by acting as a “security producer rather than a security consumer” through multifaceted cooperation with Russia and China, positioning itself as a “balancer of the balance” within the framework of shifting global power dynamics.
From Turkey’s perspective, it would be more in line with the traditional understanding of foreign policy if the relationships to be developed with Russia and China do not take the form of a bloc policy that is, in the classical sense, anti-Western and creates unilateral dependence on Russia and China. In this regard, it is of great importance that the relationships taking shape within the framework of a Turkey-Russia-China alliance be conducted on the basis of a strategic cooperation model that is “equal, based on flexible adaptation, where no party seeks to dominate the other, and grounded in a mutual win-win approach.” Undoubtedly, while developing multifaceted political, economic, and technological relations with Russia and China, it is equally crucial that Turkey does not compromise on its strategic relations with the West or the gains it has achieved. This strategy will contribute to Turkey strengthening its strategic autonomy within a multipolar international system and creating new areas of cooperation. In this context, for Turkey to contribute more to peace and prosperity as a “balancing actor” at both the regional and global levels, it must develop “domain-specific and multifaceted collaborations” that reinforce its strategic autonomy, rather than forming an anti-Western ideological bloc with Russia and China. At this juncture, strategic answers must be provided to the questions: “For whom is the alliance?”, “Why the alliance?”, “To what extent?”, and “In which areas?”
For Whom Is This “Alliance”?
First of all, what is actually meant by “alliance” here is a “strengthened strategic partnership.”
From Turkey’s perspective, the primary objective of a potential Turkey-Russia-China rapprochement would not be to serve the interests of any single global power. The fundamental goal is all of humanity. Therefore, the concept of an enhanced partnership should be based on a model that does not create dependency among the parties (Turkey-Russia-China), limit or lock down decision-making mechanisms, but rather, on the contrary, strengthens the parties’ decision-making capacities within the framework of a shared understanding of civilization. This cooperation process should not be limited solely to relations with Russia and China. One of Turkey’s long-term strategic goals is to strengthen political, economic, cultural, and logistical integration with the Turkic world within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The Turkic region possesses significant strategic potential in terms of energy resources, a young population, geopolitical location, and trade corridors. For this reason, the OTS emerges as an integration movement that will serve prosperity, peace, stability, and security not only at the regional level but also on a global scale.
Why an “Alliance”?
From Turkey’s perspective, the primary reason for developing relations with Russia and China is the shifting global balance of power. Today, economic production hubs, energy routes, trade corridors, and technology centers are increasingly shifting toward Asia. For Turkey to remain on the sidelines of this transformation could pose serious strategic risks. However, the critical point here is that Turkey must not fall into a passive position vis-à-vis Russia and China. This is because the economies of China and Russia are on a much larger scale compared to Turkey’s. “Uncontrolled economic integration could widen Turkey’s trade deficit and weaken domestic production capacity.” Indeed, there is a significant imbalance in Turkey’s trade with China. As of 2025, while Turkey’s exports to China remained at approximately $3 billion, its imports reached nearly $50 billion. Similarly, in energy-centered trade with Russia, a significant trade deficit has emerged to Turkey’s disadvantage. In contrast, Turkey’s trade with the U.S. and Europe exhibits a more balanced structure. For this reason, it is crucial that Turkey’s core strategy be to position itself as a “production partner rather than merely a market.” In other words, Turkey must develop its relations with China and Russia not solely through import-driven trade, but through a model centered on “joint production, technology transfer, industrial investment, and joint expansion into third markets.” This approach holds great importance for ensuring a healthier, more balanced, stable, and robust future.
How Much of an “Alliance”?
From Turkey’s perspective, the most rational model is not a fully dependent military bloc, but rather an “area-based strategic partnership.” This is because, as seen in the example of the war in Ukraine, Turkey possesses a multifaceted foreign policy capacity that allows it to maintain relations with both the West and the East. Turkey’s NATO membership holds strategic importance within this framework. Turkey’s NATO membership is not merely a matter of military security. Thanks to its veto power within NATO, Turkey is able to protect itself against the potential NATO membership of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (GRC) and Israel. This is important for Turkey’s ability to pursue a policy of balance and to safeguard its strategic position within the West.
Although Turkey joined NATO primarily due to security concerns regarding the Soviet Union, in the years that followed, NATO membership evolved into a strategic tool that at times also protected Turkey against certain NATO members. If Turkey were to remain outside NATO, threats to Turkey’s interests in critical geopolitical areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea would increase further. In this context, Turkey’s NATO membership is significant not only in terms of defending against external threats but also in terms of maintaining the balance of power within the alliance. On the other hand, by joining the U.S.-centered Western alliance established after World War II, Turkey developed cooperation with the powerful actors of the time and sought to protect its national interests through this means. In international relations, it is of great importance for states to develop balanced relations with the rising power centers of the era in order to protect their own interests and enhance their strategic gains. In this context, given the assessment that the global power center is increasingly shifting toward the Asia-Pacific axis, strengthening cooperation with Russia and China in political, economic, and technological spheres is not a strategic choice for Turkey, but a necessity. Therefore, the most prudent policy scenario for Turkey would be to develop controlled and balanced partnerships with Russia and China in the fields of energy, technology, logistics, defense, and trade, without completely severing ties with the Western alliance.
In which areas can cooperation, partnerships, and alliances be developed?
a) Energy Security
Turkey serves as a critical transit hub for both Russia and Central Asia to transport their energy reserves to European and global markets. Projects such as TANAP and the Turkish Stream are concrete examples of this. In this context, strategic partnerships and/or collaborations that could be developed between Turkey and Russia in the energy sector include the following areas: 1) Projects aimed at establishing a petroleum and natural gas hub, 2) Energy pipelines such as the Turkish Stream, 3) Nuclear energy investments, 4) Security in the Black Sea, 5) Ensuring Europe’s energy supply.
b) Trade Corridors and Logistics Hubs
Turkey’s geographical location is of strategic importance for China’s Belt and Road Initiative to reach Europe. In this context, the 1) Central Corridor via the Caspian Sea, 2) Zangezur Corridor, 3) Development Road Project, and 4) connections to the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea enhance Turkey’s geopolitical value. For China and Russia’s access to European, Balkan, and Middle Eastern markets, Turkey serves not only as the shortest and safest route but also as a central logistics hub. Within this framework, the benefits Turkey can achieve can be listed as follows: 1) Serving as both a transit and a hub country for energy, 2) Securing access to affordable and long-term energy supplies, 3) Ensuring energy security, 4) Becoming a regional and global power in energy diplomacy, 5) Facilitating integration across all sectors between Turkey and the Turkic regions through energy corridors and logistics hubs.
c) Technology, Finance, and the Digital Economy
Turkey, Russia, and China can build digital financial infrastructures and new areas of cooperation by conducting trade in local currencies, developing alternative payment systems, and establishing joint investment mechanisms. However, Turkey’s primary priority here should be “increasing economic diversification without creating financial dependency.” Strategic partnerships and/or collaborations to be developed between Turkey and China should not be limited to merely “cheap imports” from China to Turkey. On the contrary, cooperation between the two countries should be developed in the following ways: 1) Joint production and the marketing of these goods to the West, 2) Technology transfer, 3) The establishment of factories in Turkey, 4) Support for high-value-added industrial investments by both Turkish and Chinese investors. The strategic sectors that could be developed between Turkey and China can be listed as follows: 1) Electric vehicle batteries, 2) Chip technologies, 3) Artificial intelligence, 4) Space technologies, 5) Satellite systems, 6) Engine technologies, 7) Cybersecurity, 8) Telecommunications infrastructure, 8) Rail systems and railway corridors, 9) Digital trade infrastructure, 10) Port technologies, 11) Free trade zones, 12) Cooperation in supply chains/corridors (such as the Middle Corridor and the Development Road Project).
In conclusion, from Turkey’s perspective, the primary objective of a potential “Turkey-Russia-China” rapprochement is not to align with any bloc politics, but rather to strengthen Turkey’s strategic autonomy in a multipolar world in accordance with the spirit of a multidimensional foreign policy approach based on balance, and to contribute to regional and global peace, stability, prosperity, and security. For Turkey’s long-term strategic vision is to position itself as an independent and balancing power within the new multipolar international order, without being a subsystem of any global power. Therefore, the format of the relationships and cooperation to be developed must be “equal,” “complementary,” “based on mutual respect,” “focused on joint production,” “involving joint technology transfer,” “prioritizing mutual complementarity over unilateral dependency,” “taking into account the balance of foreign trade,” and “centered on Turkey’s national and international interests.”
