India’s relations with Iran are largely based on shared geopolitical interests and regional policies. The United States’ (U.S.) conflict with Iran has also led to major geopolitical shifts in the region. Despite this, Washington has managed to keep its relations with New Delhi at a manageable level. Indeed, looking at the past decade, India’s purchase of the S-400 from Russia in 2018, the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, and the U.S. War with Iran in 2026 have all posed major geopolitical challenges to U.S.-India relations. Despite all these geopolitical upheavals, India’s ability to maintain its relations with the U.S., Iran, and Russia at a sustainable level has been remarkable.
The U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran has turned into a crisis that is testing both India’s national security interests and its geopolitical partnerships. Claims that India shared the location of an Iranian naval vessel visiting its shores with Israel at the very outset of the conflict, and the subsequent targeting of that vessel by Israel[i] have laid bare the fragile geopolitical alliance between Tehran and Delhi. Further on, Iran, which closed the Strait of Hormuz, struck Indian oil tankers, and in response to this incident, India delivered a protest note to Iran’s Ambassador in New Delhi.[ii]
In the latest incident on June 10, 2026, three Indian sailors lost their lives because of U.S. attacks on an oil tanker off the coast of the Arabian Sea[iii] and New Delhi conveyed a letter protesting the situation to the Americans through diplomatic channels. Despite this tragic incident from India’s perspective, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s warm messages addressed to U.S. President Donald Trump via the social media platform X have drawn criticism and backlash from the public.[iv] The fact that India has been targeted in the Strait of Hormuz by both Iranian and U.S. forces due to the ongoing war underscores how fragile the geopolitical partnerships New Delhi has established with these actors truly are.
From the U.S. perspective, it appears that the Iran War was intended to be transformed into a controlled crisis. In this context, one can speak of a crisis management strategy based on cooperation between the U.S. and India that is fully under control in the energy sector. On this matter, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has stated that he personally requested India to increase its oil purchases from Russia, particularly following the war in Ukraine.[v]Similarly, following the Iran War, India’s energy imports from the U.S. have risen. For example, as of May 2026, the U.S. has taken the top spot in India’s imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).[vi]
During this process, Trump initially raised tariffs on India, turned this into a bargaining chip, and demanded that India reduce its purchases of Russian oil to zero and buy from the US in exchange for lowering the tariffs. From this perspective, it can be argued that by declaring war on Iran, Trump both triggered a controlled crisis and, by capitalizing on this crisis, succeeded in pressuring and drawing certain geopolitical allies—such as India—to his side. India’s strategic partnership with Israel has played a significant role in this alignment. Indeed, in line with its geopolitical interests, New Delhi is positioning itself much closer to actors in the Middle East such as Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the U.S., and in this equation, the value and cooperation India attributes to Iran are taking a back seat.
Based on the information above, it can be argued that strategic autonomy in India’s foreign policy has led to far greater geopolitical fractures and challenges. The inability to develop a full-fledged strategic partnership with virtually any actor in foreign policy means that India has just as few allies. In this regard, it appears that India may find itself in a geopolitical bind in its relations with the United States, Iran, and Russia, as well as with its neighbors, immediate region, and major powers. This state of being caught in a bind also constitutes the greatest dilemma of India’s foreign policy.
In fact, the mismatch between India’s geopolitical objectives and its current foreign policy stance has been evident for many years, particularly in regional projects. The clearest example of this is India’s strategy to bypass Pakistan and open to Central Asia and Eurasia via Iran (the Chabahar Port and the North-South Transport Corridor). To achieve this geopolitical goal, India must establish a close strategic partnership with Iran. In this sense, while Iran is an indispensable geopolitical gateway in India’s Eurasian strategy, New Delhi has been unable to provide its ally with the necessary diplomatic and economic support in the face of the containment and sanctions policies imposed on Iran by the U.S. and Israel. New Delhi’s decision to halt oil imports from Iran under pressure from Washington and to suspend the Chabahar project for an extended period demonstrates that it has drifted away from geopolitical realities and is experiencing strategic paralysis amid U.S.-Iran tensions. This indecisive stance prevents India from building full trust within the Western bloc while also leaving it at risk of losing its historical partners in Eurasia.
Ultimately, this series of events clearly demonstrates how India’s balancing act, carried out under the banner of “strategic autonomy,” has devolved into geopolitical paralysis and inaction on the ground during moments of acute crisis. New Delhi, which can be targeted by both Washington and Tehran “when necessary,” remains in a highly vulnerable and passive position in crisis management. Therefore, New Delhi’s ability to build much stronger alliances and genuine friendships in foreign policy will also mitigate certain vulnerabilities or challenges that strategic autonomy may entail.
[i] “Hindistan: İran gemisinin konumunu İsrail’e biz verdik”, Son Dakika, https://www.sondakika.com/dunya/haber-hindistan-iran-gemisinin-konumunu-israil-e-biz-19638635/, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
[ii] “Hindistan, Hürmüz Boğazı’ndaki gemi saldırıları ardından İran büyükelçisini bakanlığa çağırdı”, Haberler, https://www.haberler.com/politika/hindistan-bandrali-tankerlere-hurmuz-bogazi-nda-saldiri-19762542-haberi/, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
[iii] “Three Indian sailors killed in US strike on oil tanker”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy73dr081p8o, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
[iv] “Modi thanks Trump for wishes as US attacks Indian seafarers”, The Canary, https://www.thecanary.co/global/world-analysis/2026/06/11/modi-trump/, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
[v] “‘US wanted India to buy Russian oil’: Jaishankar slams tariff flip-flop”, The Federal, https://thefederal.com/category/news/jaishankar-us-asked-india-buy-russian-oil-ukraine-war-tariffs-246357, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
[vi] “U.S. becomes India’s top gas supplier, as Iran war cuts it off from the Gulf”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/11/us-india-lng-lpg-supply.html, (Access Date: June 12, 2026).
