Analysis

The US Military Buildup in the Caribbean

The Venezuelan crisis has once again made the Caribbean one of the focal points of global power competition.
The Trump administration's military buildup in the Caribbean has turned into a political strategy of pressure on Venezuela, beyond the rhetoric of fighting narcotics.
Instead of direct intervention, the US has aimed to weaken the Maduro administration through a show of force and psychological deterrence.

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The recent military activity carried out by the Donald Trump administration in the Caribbean Sea has reached levels not seen in Latin American geopolitics for a long time. Consisting of warships, fighter jets, bombers, marines, unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence aircraft, this force has been evaluated not only as a maritime patrol, but also as part of a strong message. Although this mass of the United States of America (USA) is presented in official discourses as a “counter-narcotics operation”, it is believed that a more comprehensive political goal lies behind it, namely, the goal of promoting regime change in Venezuela.[i]

This activity in the Caribbean has been interpreted as a show of force given not only to Venezuela, but to all of Latin America. The organization of “offensive demonstrations” by long-range B-52 bombers in areas near the Venezuelan coast has highlighted the deterrence capacity of the United States. At the same time, the statements that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been authorized to conduct secret operations in Venezuela have shown that Washington has demonstrated a determination that goes beyond its diplomatic rhetoric. These steps have been too far-reaching to be evaluated solely within the framework of the fight against drug trafficking.

The US administration announced that the operation was carried out in order to “stop the flow of narcotics”. However, the force structure used indicates the existence of a strategic goal beyond this justification. Because the countries that stand out in the narcotic drug trade are Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, Venezuela is better known as one of the transit routes from south to north. In addition, the 2025 report of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) showed that 84% of the narcotics seized in the United States originated from Colombia, while Venezuela was not even mentioned as the main source.[ii] For this reason, a large-scale build-up in the Caribbean Sea involving aircraft carriers and warplanes only gives the impression of a disproportionate force for the “fight against narcotics”.

The diplomatic dimension of these developments is also extremely noteworthy. The Venezuelan government considered these US moves as a threat to sovereignty. Maduro claimed that Washington was trying to create a “new endless war” and argued that military pressure would do nothing but deepen his country’s economic crisis.[iii] The allegations that some small boats were shot down during the naval and air operations of the United States have caused concern among the countries of the region. Dec. Many governments in Latin America have questioned the compliance of such operations with international law. Because conducting operations in the territorial waters of another country or in its immediate vicinity under the pretext of fighting drugs may conflict with the prohibition of the use of force of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

Despite this, the Washington administration presented these operations as a legitimate security measure. US state officials have suggested that “narco-terrorist networks” in Venezuela threaten regional security.[iv] This discourse also seemed to align with Trump’s political line. Although Trump promised to “stop overthrowing foreign regimes” during his election campaign in 2016, he adopted the understanding of “regime pressure through a show of force” during his period of power. This policy has been carried out with elements of covert operations, economic sanctions and psychological warfare instead of a classic military intervention.

The military buildup in the Caribbean has also been interpreted as a sign of the United States’ return to its strategic priorities in Latin America. Washington, which partially lost interest in the region after the Cold War, has turned to an effective power projection policy again in recent years, with the increasing influence of China and Russia in Latin America. In this context, Venezuela has become not only a target country but also an area for the United States to restore its regional deterrence. The active use of Puerto Rico as a base has strengthened the logistical capacity of the United States. This situation has shown that the Caribbean is once again at the center of the “Western Hemisphere Strategy”

The regional repercussions of this operation have also been felt on different planes. Many countries in Latin America have expressed that such US military maneuvers risk polarizing the region again. Brazil and Mexico, in particular, have warned that an open military intervention could worsen the humanitarian situation in Venezuela. However, some opposition circles think that the US pressure may increase the pressure on the Maduro regime. However, in the long term, the possibility of external pressures triggering internal dissolution remains uncertain.

Trump’s Venezuela policy was not based solely on military means; it also included diplomatic and economic elements. Washington has offered a $50 million reward to anyone who provides information that could lead to Maduro’s capture.[v]However, this initiative did not have the expected effect. Because most of the ruling elite in Venezuela is deeply connected to the corruption networks that arise from the country’s oil revenues. Therefore, the prize money has not been enough to break the chain of loyalty.

In light of all of these, it can be concluded that the Trump administration’s strategy for Venezuela is not only “Deconfliction”, but also the policy of regional power projection. This policy has become part of an effort to redefine the United States’ influence in Latin America. However, the sustainability of this approach is controversial. Because large-scale military build-ups create high costs in the long run and carry the risk of increasing regional reactions

As a result, the US military presence in the Caribbean has become a tool for both deterrence and diplomatic pressure. It is clear that Washington’s goal is to increase internal pressure on Venezuela, even if it is not a direct invasion. This situation has become a new example of the balance of power games that Latin America has been witnessing for a long time. The Trump administration has decoupled along the line between “hard power” and “signal diplomacy” in international politics by using military and diplomatic means together. For Venezuela, this process has turned into a struggle for sovereignty, as well as an economic crisis. For the United States, this has been an attempt to retest its effectiveness in Latin America and consolidate its global role. It seems that this strategic tension, which began in the Caribbean, has ceased to be merely a regional issue and has become a new arena of global power competition.


[i] Wells, Ione, and Joshua Cheetham. “Warships, Fighter Jets and the CIA – What Is Trump’s Endgame in Venezuela?”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gp2lxz75eo, (Access Date: 02.11.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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