Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea after approximately seven years can, at first glance, be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the traditional alliance ties in Beijing-Pyongyang relations. Indeed, during the visit, the two leaders emphasized historical friendship, announced that cooperation would be expanded in the fields of politics, economy, culture, education, sports, technology, and tourism, and delivered a message of “joint struggle against hegemony and power politics.” [i] However, when the timing of the visit and the messages given beforehand are evaluated together, the picture that emerges is not merely one of strengthened relations between the two countries. In particular, Kim Yo-jong’s statement on nuclear status before the visit, the latest developments in Russia–North Korea relations, and China’s use of multipolarity discourse during the talks indicate that relations between the two countries are being reshaped not only along the axis of security, but also through role definitions, strategic priorities, discursive frameworks, and regional positioning. Indeed, China’s description of this visit as “a new historical starting point in relations between the two countries” shows that Beijing seeks not merely to maintain existing relations, but to adapt them to changing regional and global conditions.
One of the most striking dimensions of this transformation can be seen in North Korea’s discourse regarding its nuclear program. In her statement before Xi’s visit, Kim Yo-jong emphasized that North Korea would not step back from its status as a nuclear state and stated that the country’s nuclear deterrence capacity was irreversible.[ii] At first glance, this statement may be interpreted as a new challenge directed at the United States. However, when the structure of the discourse is examined, it becomes clear that Pyongyang is not merely defending its nuclear weapons. The main striking point is that North Korea now presents its nuclear program not as a negotiable security issue, but as an inseparable part of its state identity and international position.
For many years, North Korea was defined in the international system as a “problematic state that needed to be denuclearized.” However, the discourse used by Pyongyang in the recent period rejects this role and demands a different one in its place. Kim Yo-jong’s statements show that North Korea is now trying to position itself not as the object of denuclearization negotiations, but as an actor whose nuclear status must be recognized. Therefore, nuclear capacity does not only produce military deterrence; it also becomes an instrument of the demand for international status and recognition. Thus, the message given before the visit was directed not only at Washington, but also at all regional actors, including China. While Pyongyang shows that it is open to developing its relations, it also clearly demonstrates that this will not come at the cost of abandoning its nuclear status. At the same time, the fact that the denuclearization issue did not appear on the visible agenda of the talks during the visit suggests that, at the current stage, the parties prioritize strategic rapprochement, economic cooperation, and regional stability.
In order to understand North Korea’s confident foreign policy discourse in the recent period, the Russia factor must be taken into account. After the Ukraine War, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang were not limited merely to increased diplomatic contacts, but took on a more comprehensive character that also included military and strategic dimensions. In particular, high-level visits between the two countries, claims of cooperation in the field of defense, and international assessments regarding North Korea’s ammunition support to Russia indicate that relations have entered a new phase.[iii] These developments have contributed to Pyongyang’s redefinition of its position in the international system, while also expanding its room for maneuver in foreign policy. Of course, this situation does not eliminate China’s economic and diplomatic influence over North Korea. However, deepening relations with Russia allow Pyongyang to diversify its external relations and partially balance its dependence on Beijing.
Here, the concept of strategic autonomy can be used to explain North Korea’s effort to diversify its foreign policy options and expand its room for movement in decision-making processes. Today, North Korea still needs close relations with China economically and diplomatically. However, at the same time, thanks to the cooperation it has developed with Russia, it appears to have more options compared to the past. This situation makes it difficult to evaluate Pyongyang merely as an isolated actor supported by China. On the contrary, North Korea gives the impression of being an actor that tries to expand its own room for movement by using the opportunities created by great-power competition. In this framework, Xi’s visit is important not only in terms of maintaining traditional friendship relations, but also in terms of adapting China–North Korea relations to new conditions in the face of changing regional balances. Xi’s visit to Pyongyang after his recent intensive diplomatic contacts with Washington and Moscow can be associated with China’s desire to make its regional partnership networks more visible in the changing international environment and to reaffirm the strategic relations around it.
One of the most striking aspects of the visit is also the discourse used by China. Among the concepts emphasized by Beijing during the talks were “hegemony,” “power politics,” and “multipolarity.”[iv] The noteworthy point here is that China pushed its traditional security discourses regarding the Korean Peninsula into the background. Indeed, during the talks, concepts such as denuclearization, nuclear crisis, or military threat were not brought to the forefront; instead, a broader discursive framework regarding the future of the international system was preferred. This does not mean that Beijing has abandoned the goal of denuclearization. However, it suggests that at the current stage, priority is being given not to the nuclear issue, but to strengthening bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and the preservation of regional stability.
In recent years, concepts such as multipolarity, common development, and respect for sovereignty have gained a more prominent place in Chinese foreign policy. The discourse Xi used in Pyongyang is also a reflection of this approach. Beijing addresses the North Korea issue not only through security problems on the Korean Peninsula, but also by connecting it to debates on the distribution of power and order in the international system. In this way, for China, the North Korea file goes beyond being a regional crisis topic and is presented as one of the elements supporting the vision of a multipolar world.
Within this framework, the visit also reveals the roles that the parties attribute to themselves in the international system. While China comes to the forefront as an actor that supports stability and advocates transformation in the existing balance of power, North Korea emphasizes the image of a sovereign state capable of determining its strategic preferences independently despite external pressures. Thus, the talks shed light not only on the future of bilateral relations, but also on how both countries define their international positions.
At the same time, the noteworthy point is that China and North Korea narrate the same relationship through different priorities. Chinese media and official statements emphasize more strongly economic cooperation, development, connectivity, and strategic communication.[v] On the North Korean side, however, discourses of sovereignty, independence, special friendship, and nuclear status are more visible.[vi] This does not mean that there is a divergence of views between the two countries. However, it shows that the parties make sense of the same strategic rapprochement through different conceptual frameworks. While China presents the relationship as a more institutional and multidimensional network of cooperation, North Korea frames the same relationship as the diplomatic success of an actor protecting its national sovereignty.
The importance of this difference lies in the fact that it shows the visit cannot be read merely as the strengthening of bilateral relations. This is because the meaning that the parties attach to the relationship also gives clues about the roles they want to assume in the international system. By associating its relations with North Korea with the discourse of multipolarity and regional stability, China positions itself as a supporter of an alternative international order. North Korea, on the other hand, presents the same relationship as an instrument that strengthens its diplomatic legitimacy and strategic autonomy without making concessions on its nuclear status. The visit is not only a confirmation of the existing alliance, but also part of the process through which the two actors redefine their own roles in the changing international environment.
This situation can also be seen in the areas of cooperation announced after the visit. The emphasis on fields such as economy, education, culture, sports, technology, and tourism shows that China–North Korea relations do not proceed only through security and ideological closeness. On the contrary, relations between the two countries are increasingly acquiring a more institutional and multidimensional structure. This is also important in terms of ensuring that the relationship can be sustained without being dependent on periods of crisis. Thus, the visit ceases to be merely a diplomatic symbol and turns into a more comprehensive process of strategic coordination supported through economic and social connections.
In conclusion, Xi’s visit to Pyongyang shows that China–North Korea relations are being interpreted within a new framework under changing regional and global conditions, beyond merely representing the continuation of the traditional China–North Korea alliance. The discourses that came to the forefront during the visit made visible, at the same time, North Korea’s effort to position its nuclear status as an inseparable element of its state identity, the relative strategic flexibility it has gained through its developing relations with Russia, and China’s foreign policy approach centered on multipolarity. For this reason, the visit can be evaluated not only as a diplomatic contact indicating the strengthening of bilateral relations, but also as an important development revealing the roles that Beijing and Pyongyang attribute to themselves in the international system and the discourses they use to legitimize these roles. In this respect, Xi’s visit to Pyongyang offers important clues not only about the future of China–North Korea relations, but also about how states define new roles for themselves in the multipolar international order.
[i] Heejin Kim & Josh D. Arslan, “China’s Xi hails deeper understanding at end of North Korea summit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/north-korea-china-agree-expand-cooperation-various-sectors-north-koreas-state-2026-06-08/, (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
[ii] “North Korea reaffirms nuclear status a day before Chinese president’s visit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/north-korea-will-not-retreat-nuclear-status-kim-jong-uns-sister-says-2026-06-06/, (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
[iii] Tom Balmforth & Mariano Zafra, “Inside North Korea’s Vast Operation to Help Russia’s War on Ukraine”. Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/, (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
[iv] Jack Kim & Liz Lee, “China’s Xi vows unwavering support for North Korea’s Kim in rare Pyongyang visit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-he-will-work-with-north-korea-fight-hegemony-north-korean-media-2026-06-07/, (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
[v] “Xi says he reaches important consensus with Kim on developing China-DPRK relations in new era”, ChinaDaily, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202606/09/WS6a27cd96a310d6866eb4d440.html (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
[vi] Anton Sokolin, Shreyas Reddy, “Xi wraps up North Korea trip with visits to friendship tower, cadre school”, NK News, https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/xi-wraps-up-north-korea-trip-with-visits-to-friendship-tower-cadre-school/, (Date Accessed: 09.06.2026).
