In February 2026, Mexico’s security and political dynamics witnessed one of the most significant anti-organized crime operations in the country’s history. Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known by his alias El Mencho, was regarded by international and regional security circles as the leader of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), still considered one of the most powerful cartel organizations in the country. On February 22, 2026, it was announced that Oseguera Cervantes had been killed during a special operation conducted by the Mexican armed forces in Tapalpa. This event represents a significant turning point not only for Mexico but also at the regional and global levels in the context of drug trafficking, state security strategies, and international relations.[1]
To assess the likely consequences of this death soundly, three fundamental dimensions must be examined together. First, the extent to which the state has been able to establish public authority across the national territory and sustainably exercise its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; second, how cartels are integrated into global economic and security structures through transnational networks of finance, arms, and drug trafficking; and third, how Mexico’s security cooperation with other states is shaped within the framework of sovereignty, intervention, and interdependence. When these three levels are considered together, it becomes clear that this development is not merely a security operation but a multilayered transformation connected to state authority, the transnational criminal economy, and international power balances.
In Mexico, the state’s struggle against organized crime is a controversial success–failure dilemma regarding democratic legitimacy. Over the past fifteen years, the state has attempted to weaken cartels through military- and security-centered strategies. The 2026 operation once again represents a straightforward implementation of this policy. However, such operations often remain limited in their ability to break the structural continuity of criminal organizations beyond eliminating their leaders. Many academic studies indicate that leadership decapitation strategies tend to increase cartel violence and accelerate organizational adaptation temporarily.
Following the death of Oseguera Cervantes, waves of violence, road blockades, and attacks against security forces occurred in at least 16 Mexican states, and it was reported that at least 55 people lost their lives.[2] This situation reveals two fundamental problems in terms of state capacity: first, that the state’s claim to a monopoly of force continues to face severe disruptions at the local level; and second, that such killings create new arenas of competition among criminal organizations, thereby further deepening the cycle of violence. It has also been reported that nearly 10,000 troops were deployed following the operation.[3]
This picture reveals two fundamental problems regarding state capacity. First, the central authority has not been established uniformly across the entire national territory, and in certain regions, de facto control is still shared with armed actors. Second, leadership decapitations can trigger inter-organizational competition, causing violence to spread both spatially and across different actors. In this context, the issue extends beyond the operational effectiveness of security forces; it also concerns the institutional resilience of local governments, the functionality of judicial mechanisms, and the capacity of public institutions to withstand corruption.
When the transnational dimension is taken into account, it is well known that the CJNG’s activities have been closely linked to the shipment of synthetic drugs to the U.S. market. In particular, the production and distribution of fentanyl have intensified security cooperation between the two countries, strengthening intelligence sharing and joint operational mechanisms. However, this cooperation proceeds on fragile ground due to power asymmetries and sensitivities surrounding sovereignty. Efforts to address the public health crisis in the United States through external supply chains have generated criticism in Mexico, with some arguing that security policies are being shaped under external pressure. Therefore, the operation represents not only an internal security measure but also a concrete manifestation of the interdependent relationship between the two countries.
This tension is also intricately connected to the Mexican government’s internal policy strategies. Under President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration, there has been an emphasis on approaching the security problem through social welfare–based policies, moving beyond previously more militarized strategies. However, the surge in violence following the Oseguera Cervantes case has once again made visible the tension between long-term policies aimed at addressing socioeconomic inequalities and short-term security threats. The state, while deploying military capacity, is simultaneously obligated to preserve democratic oversight and civil liberties. Considering Latin America’s historical experiences, this balance is critical for institutional stability.
Moreover, the economic dimension must not be overlooked. Mexico’s growing role in global supply chains and its deep economic integration with the United States directly link security risks to the investment climate. In regions where cartel violence intensifies, infrastructure projects, logistics corridors, and industrial investments face significant security costs. This demonstrates that the fight against organized crime must be approached not only as a matter of security policy, but also as one of development and economic stability.
In conclusion, while the death of Oseguera Cervantes is symbolically and operationally significant, it does not in itself possess the capacity to transform the structural dynamics of Mexico’s cartel economy. As long as the continuity of drug demand, arms trafficking, money laundering networks, and institutional fragilities at the local level persist, organized crime networks can reproduce themselves under different actors and forms. The decisive factor will be whether the state can establish consistent authority nationwide, strengthen the rule of law, and build a sustainable balance between security and freedom. The elimination of Oseguera Cervantes represents only one stage in this long-term process; lasting transformation depends on institutional depth, political will, and sustained regional cooperation.
[1] “Mexico kills Nemesio Oseguera, ‘El Mencho,’ the world’s most wanted drug lord”, El Pais, https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-02-22/mexico-kills-nemesio-oseguera-el-mencho-the-worlds-most-wanted-drug-lord.html, (Date Accessed: 25.02.2026).
[2] “Cartel violence kills 55 across Mexico after El Mencho’s death”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/cartel-violence-kills-55-across-mexico-after-el-mencho-s-death/3838935 (Date Accessed: 25.02.2026).
[3] “Thousands of troops deployed to end clashes in Mexico over death of drug lord ‘El Mencho’”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/02/24/thousands-of-troops-deployed-to-end-clashes-in-mexico-over-death-of-drug-lord-el-mencho, (Date Accessed: 25.02.2026).
