The 2026 NATO Summit, to be held in Ankara in July, is considered a critical threshold indicating the structural transformation of the transatlantic security architecture, rather than just a routine meeting updating the alliance’s current threat perception. Europe’s increasing security concerns and the European Union’s (EU) initiatives to strengthen its defense industry capacity have brought the discussion of a “controlled capability transfer” within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the forefront. In this context, it is anticipated that the post-summit period will shape into a hybrid transition process where Europe will take on more responsibility in the field of security, while continuing to operate within the NATO framework.
In this regard, experts from the Atlantic Council, a U.S.-based think tank that aims to support NATO values and enhance transatlantic cooperation, have made five recommendations for the success of the Summit.[i] One of these, the idea of “Establishing a NATO Transition Planning Group” to maintain the U.S. capabilities needed in Europe, envisions a framework that determines which of these capabilities will be transferred to European allies, under what conditions, and within what timeline. Especially in areas such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, satellite-based intelligence, and integrated air defense systems, the framework plans for Europe to gradually take on responsibilities, aiming to transform NATO from an “operational facilitator” into a “transition management platform.”
Under the decision made at NATO’s 2025 Summit, it is expected that Alliance members will commit to allocating 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to direct and indirect defense spending by 2030. [ii] While this will contribute to the new defense plan, it is inevitable that a portion of these contributions will continue to be provided by the United States. However, the United States’ plan to withdraw some of its currently stationed troops in Europe and redeploy them in Asia and the Pacific,[iii] if not aligned with the pace of Europe’s military restructuring, is considered to potentially create critical gaps that could significantly weaken NATO’s deterrence. Therefore, ensuring that the transition is systematic and planned in a way that does not hinder it, preparing realistic timelines for when and how the capabilities currently under U.S. dominance should transition to European responsibility, determining priorities, and deciding which European Alliance member or members will take the lead in the areas being transitioned, will be among the tasks of the Transition Planning Board if the proposal is considered.
When considered together with the “Security Action for Europe (SAFE)”[iv] budgeted at 150 billion euros, which is designed to support EU members in making investments thru joint procurement in defense industry production and to finance large-scale investments by focusing on priority defense capabilities, it becomes evident that the two mechanisms are not independent of each other but rather complementary structures representing different layers of the same strategic transformation. When these two mechanisms are evaluated together, the fundamental picture that emerges indicates that the European security architecture needs to be reorganized with more European responsibility and capacity, without completely severing ties with the US-centered structure.
The SAFE mechanism constitutes the industrial and financial aspect of this transformation. Because for the capabilities that NATO is considering transferring to Europe to be sustainable, Europe must not only be able to use them but also produce them. Therefore, SAFE aims to scale up the European defense industry and increase joint production capacity in areas such as air defense systems, ammunition production, unmanned systems, cybersecurity, space, and reconnaissance-surveillance technologies. In this context, the emerging process represents a more complex transformation than a classic “European Army” project; the aim is not to break away from NATO, but to create a more European distribution of capacity within NATO. While the US remains the strategic backbone of the system, the aim is for Europe to take on more responsibility, particularly in conventional capacity, ammunition production, regional logistics, and certain naval-air missions.
Another recommendation from Atlantic Council experts for the success of the summit is to hand over any maritime security initiative escorting tankers stranded in the Strait of Hormuz to a longer-term NATO-led operation. Utilizing the capabilities of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces (SNF), particularly the Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Group, which is relatively strong among European allies, to address the mines placed in the Strait of Hormuz, especially for the detection and clearance of mines and the restoration of the security of maritime transportation routes, may seem theoretically feasible for multinational units with high readiness levels. However, since this task falls outside NATO’s area of responsibility, there may be issues in obtaining approval from all members of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Therefore, it is considered more likely that countries will prefer to assign tasks individually. Because, from Iran’s perspective, the presence of NATO mine-clearing units in the Strait of Hormuz could be perceived not as a technical maritime security operation but rather as a military intervention or taking a biased position. Especially an operation conducted under the NATO flag is considered to increase the risk of direct tension between Iran and NATO, which is why many NATO members are expected to be cautious about the alliance acting as a direct operational actor on the ground.
In conclusion, when evaluating the overall strategic outlook, it is expected that the NATO system will not undergo a complete transformation after the Ankara Summit, but rather enter a controlled “Europeanization” process. In this process, Europe will gradually take on certain defense capabilities, while the United States will continue to be the strategic backbone of the system. While the SAFE mechanism will form the production aspect of this transformation, the NATO Transition Plan will take on the functions of operational coordination and risk management. When these two structures are evaluated together, the resulting model will not be a geopolitical separation based on a break, but rather a hybrid security architecture where capabilities are redistributed. Additionally, while the deployment of NATO’s Permanent Naval Forces for mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz is legally and technically possible, its feasibility is considered weak.
[i] “Five ideas to make the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara a success”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/five-ideas-to-make-the-upcoming-nato-summit-in-ankara-a-success/, (Date Accessed: 28.05.2026).
[ii] Reuben A. (2026). “How much do Nato members spend on defence?”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyz4nq91wpo, (Date Accessed: 28.05.2026).
[iii] Gordon M. R. & Gramer R. (2025). Pentagon Cuts Forces Earmarked for Europe in Event of Crisis, The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-cuts-forces-earmarked-for-europe-in-event-of-crisis-30024891?utm_, (Date Accessed:28.05.2026).
[iv] “What is Security Action for Europe (SAFE)?”, European Council-Council of European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/safe/, (Date Accessed: 28.05.2026).
