The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the fragile nodes not only of energy security, but also of the digital domain. Alongside oil tankers, invisible data flows are now equally dependent on the same geographical chokepoint. This situation is a reminder of a fundamental truth of the modern world: global power is now measured not only by the capacity to control energy resources, but also by the ability to control the flow of information.
This narrow waterway, one of the most critical transit points in global energy trade, has long been regarded as the energy artery of the global economy. Yet today, the strategic significance of Hormuz extends well beyond oil tankers. Fiber optic cables running along the seabed have simultaneously made this region one of the critical hubs of the global digital economy. From financial transactions to cloud computing, from military communications to artificial intelligence infrastructures, the vast majority of modern systems operate through undersea fiber optic networks. A crisis in Hormuz therefore has the potential to affect not only energy prices, but the global digital order as well. Thus, beyond an energy crisis, a new dimension of geopolitical vulnerability has emerged.
The vast majority of global data traffic is still transmitted through physical cables. Thousands of kilometers of fiber optic lines laid along the ocean floor function as the invisible nervous system of the modern world. The strategic importance of this infrastructure long remained below the public radar, as it is not as visible as oil or natural gas pipelines, warships, or energy terminals. Yet today, the fundamental functioning of the economic order depends on these systems. Even a few hours of data disruption can cause significant financial losses in the markets. The Strait of Hormuz represents a dangerously concentrated point in this regard. Numerous critical submarine cables connecting the Gulf States to Europe and Asia pass through this region. In this sense, the world has come to depend on the same narrow geographical chokepoint not only for oil transportation, but also for digital communications. Modern internet infrastructure is transmitted through these cables. Disruptions to submarine cables can cause serious problems, particularly in the connectivity between financial centers and data centers affecting not only technology companies, but a wide spectrum ranging from energy markets to logistics chains.
In this context, media outlets affiliated with the Iranian state have put forward a proposal envisaging the collection of fees from operators of undersea internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz, in return for their use of the maritime zones Iran considers its own.[i] Some of the world’s most critical submarine cable routes pass through the Middle East. The narrow sea passages of the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz also function as “digital chokepoints.” These maritime corridors connect the major economic hubs of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
It should be recalled that submarine cable failures in the Red Sea in 2024 disrupted approximately 25% of internet traffic between Europe and Asia. A serious submarine cable outage could have profound consequences for global connectivity. One of the most immediate effects would be the fragmentation of global communications.[ii] Regions dependent on vulnerable cable routes may experience degraded internet performance, communication disruptions, or economic instability. Countries with limited backup infrastructure particularly developing nations in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia would be disproportionately affected. Financial markets are also sensitive to such disruptions. Extremely fast and reliable data flow is a fundamental requirement for high-frequency trading systems, global payment networks, and international banking transactions. The military and strategic consequences of cable damage could be even more severe. Armed forces are heavily dependent on secure long-range communications and real-time coordination.[iii]
The digital rise of the region creates a significant paradox, as it remains dependent on an extremely fragile physical infrastructure. While Gulf economies seek to reduce their dependence on oil, they are in fact gravitating toward another sphere of dependency, namely data corridors. This further amplifies the significance of the Strait of Hormuz, since now not only energy tankers, but also global data flows, pass through the same zone of geopolitical risk.
Submarine cables are recognized as critical infrastructure elements under international law. Their protection and integrity are considered not merely a technical matter, but also a subject of international obligation. The applicable legal regime varies depending on the maritime zone through which the cables pass: in exclusive economic zones, coastal states hold sovereign rights over economic resources but cannot arbitrarily obstruct the laying of cables; on the high seas, the freedom to lay and operate cables applies in its broadest form. Nonetheless, in strategically sensitive areas such as Hormuz, legal norms are often tested against actual power balances and become open to varying interpretations in practice. Damage caused intentionally or through negligence may give rise to legal liability and trigger obligations of compensation. Yet in such incidents, one of the most significant challenges is the question of proof. Identifying the party responsible for damage to cables is often technically difficult and politically contentious. This diminishes the effectiveness of legal mechanisms and frequently shifts the matter into the diplomatic arena.
An examination of the legal regulation of submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz within the framework of rules built upon the fundamental principles of international law of the sea requires reference to certain sources. Historically, this legal regulation has passed through several distinct periods.
The first initiative in this regard is the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884, among whose original parties was the Russian Empire. This convention was subsequently supplemented by a Declaration and a Final Protocol in 1886–1887, thus marking the first step in international law toward regulating activities related to submarine cables. The Convention has not formally lapsed, as it has never been abrogated or superseded by another international agreement. However, for states that subsequently accepted obligations under the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, these new instruments which reiterate certain provisions of the 1884 Convention have taken precedence.[iv] Unlike the early telegraph cables that marked the beginning of submarine communications, modern submarine cables can transmit various types of data, including telephone calls, internet signals, and electrical power. The purposes for which submarine cables are used have diversified considerably today. For instance, some submarine cables are employed to supply electricity to offshore wind power plants. By contrast, in the previous century, these cables were predominantly used for military purposes.[v]
The 1958 Geneva Conventions laid the foundations of the contemporary period in the legal regulation of submarine cables. The 1958 Geneva Conventions laid the foundations of the contemporary period in the legal regulation of submarine cables. The provisions contained in the Convention on the High Seas and the Convention on the Continental Shelf were subsequently elaborated in greater detail in the 1982 Convention. The 1982 Convention, which today has 168 state parties according to United Nations data, holds superior legal validity over the 1958 Geneva Conventions for the states that are party to it.[vi]
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also known as the Montego Bay Convention, establishes a legal framework that divides the seas into various maritime zones and prescribes distinct international legal regimes for each of them. Under Article 3 of the Convention, territorial seas extend along the coasts of states and may reach up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines. Territorial seas are recognized as an integral part of a state’s sovereign territory. Accordingly, the coastal state holds the authority to regulate and legislate the laying of submarine cables in this zone.[vii] The laying of submarine cables in territorial waters is often subject to obtaining administrative authorization from the competent authority regarding the use of public maritime space. At a minimum, coastal states typically require a formal application submitted by the contractor, who generally acts in cooperation with the cable owner. Moreover, this authorization process may also entail obligations to pay taxes or fees.[viii]
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which may extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines, is a sui generis maritime zone that grants the coastal state sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, and certain economic activities related to natural resources (Article 56). Other states, however, continue to enjoy high seas freedoms (Article 58), which include the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines (Article 87(1)(c)). Under Article 58, all states have the right to lay submarine cables and maintain them within another state’s EEZ. However, in exercising this right, it is mandatory to give “due regard” to the rights and duties of the coastal state.[ix]
A coastal state may not prohibit or obstruct the laying of a transit submarine cable merely on the grounds that it passes through its EEZ. Article 79(2) confirms this principle with respect to the continental shelf, stating that the coastal state may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines, except in the exercise of its rights to explore the continental shelf, exploit its natural resources, or prevent pollution that may result from pipelines. Under Article 79(3), the delineation of the route of pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal state. By contrast, no such consent requirement for routing is stipulated in respect of submarine cables that merely transit through the EEZ without any coastal connection.[x]
Turning to the high seas, under UNCLOS, all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right to navigate, fly over, lay submarine cables, construct artificial islands, fish, and conduct scientific research on the high seas (Article 87). However, under Article 114 of the Convention:
- Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that persons subject to its jurisdiction who are owners of a submarine cable or pipeline laid on the high seas, and who, while laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline, shall bear the cost of the repairs.
The statement by Iran’s new leader suggesting that other fronts could be opened should the state of war continue may perhaps be interpreted as a veiled threat to the security of submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz. However, since Iran is not formally a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the provisions of the Convention are not binding upon Iran. Consequently, the direct application of the Convention’s rules with respect to the Tehran administration is not a possibility. This situation may give rise to certain shortcomings in the enforcement of the international legal order.
The fundamental structural problem of the submarine cable regime is the persistent tension between global freedom of navigation and state sovereignty. On the one hand, the global economy requires uninterrupted data flow; on the other, coastal states continue to assert control over their security domains. The legal regulation of submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz, while built upon the fundamental principles of international law of the sea, faces serious challenges. Although conventions such as UNCLOS theoretically guarantee cable security and freedom of transit, regional geopolitical tensions undermine the effectiveness of this order. The strategic importance of the region transforms the implementation of legal arrangements from a purely technical matter into an arena of geopolitical contestation.
[i] Meredith Primrose Jones, “Iran’s Threats to Hormuz Undersea Cables Highlight Vulnerabilites of Data Chokepoints”, Insurance Journal, https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/05/15/869938.htm, (Accessed: 23.05.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Рылова М.А., Швец Д.А., “Свобода прокладки подводных кабелей и право на разработку минеральных ресурсов: “на перекрестке равнозначных дорог”, Право. Журнал Высшей школы экономики, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/svoboda-prokladki-podvodnyh-kabeley-i-pravo-na-razrabotku-mineralnyh-resursov-na-perekrestke-ravnoznachnyh-dorog/viewer, 234, (Accessed: 23.05.2026).
[v] Ibid. p. 235.
[vi] Ibid. p. 235.
[vii] Marta Lahuerta Escolano, “The Legal Status and Applicable Regime of International Submarine Cables”, SubTel Forum, https://subtelforum.com/legal-status-of-submarine-cables/, (Accessed: 23.05.2026).
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Winston Qiu, “The Law of the Sea and Subsea Cables:UNCLOS Principles, Coastal State Jurisdiction, and the Indonesian Experience”, Submarine Networks, https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/the-law-of-the-sea-and-subsea-cables-unclos, (Accessed:23.05.2026).
[x] Ibid.
