French President Emmanuel Macron’s participation in the Africa Forward Summit held in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, on May 11-12, 2026, signals a new phase in Paris’s Africa policy. The fact that the summit was held for the first time in a non-Francophone African country, Kenya, carries symbolic importance. This choice demonstrates that France is attempting to move away from the traditional “Françafrique” approach, which was limited to its former colonial sphere, and instead develop a broader, multi-actor, and economically driven Africa strategy. At the summit in Nairobi, where representatives from more than 30 African countries were present, Macron emphasized the concepts of “equal partnership”, “sovereignty” and “joint investment” in relations with Africa.[i] However, when evaluated in the context of France’s declining military and political influence on the continent, this new discourse reveals a more complex picture.
In recent years, the withdrawal of France’s military presence in Africa has represented not only a shift in security policy, but also the erosion of Paris’s traditional model of influence on the continent. The expulsion of French forces by military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, followed by the restriction of French military presence in Chad, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire, indicates that the security-centered order France maintained in West and Central Africa has begun to unravel. The end of the last French military presence in Senegal is particularly symbolic, as Senegal had long been regarded as one of Paris’s most stable and closest partners in Africa. Similarly, the transfer of the Port-Bouët base in Côte d’Ivoire and the dismantling of the military structure in Chad reveal that France’s visible military power in Africa is steadily shrinking.[ii] Therefore, the transformation taking place today is not only about the loss of military bases, but also about the reopening of debates surrounding France’s historical role in Africa.
In this context, the Nairobi Summit can be interpreted not as France’s complete withdrawal from Africa, but rather as an attempt to reorganize its instruments of influence. While Paris loses the visible presence it had established through military bases and security operations, it is trying to create a new sphere of influence through economic investment, technology, energy, infrastructure, and financial mechanisms. Indeed, the €23 billion investment package announced by Macron at the summit is a concrete indicator of this transformation. Of this amount, €14 billion is expected to come from French companies and €9 billion from African partners.[iii] The fact that these investments are directed toward strategic sectors such as energy, artificial intelligence, agriculture, and technology demonstrates that France’s new strategy in Africa is being shaped not around traditional development aid, but around joint investment and the construction of economic networks.
This transformation can be seen not only as an economic opening, but also as a result of geopolitical competition. Africa is no longer merely France’s former sphere of influence; it has become a multi-centered arena in which actors such as China, Russia, the Gulf states, and the United States compete for influence. In particular, China’s expanding presence on the continent through infrastructure, mining, loans, and technology investments directly challenges France’s position in Africa. Macron’s indirect criticism of China in Nairobi, where he argued that Beijing creates dependencies in the field of critical minerals and rare earth elements, is therefore noteworthy.[iv]
This statement reveals the fundamental contradiction within France’s Africa policy. For many years, Paris established an asymmetric system of influence in Africa through military bases, monetary policy, energy agreements, political relations, and security cooperation. However, as actors such as China and Russia have increased their influence in Africa, France has begun criticizing similar dependency relations when they are created by rival powers. China’s growing economic relations with Africa through critical minerals and large-scale infrastructure projects pose long-term vulnerability risks for many African countries. Yet France’s discourse has become more visible precisely at a time when its own historical sphere of influence is shrinking and China’s influence across the continent is rapidly expanding.
France’s recent discourse toward Africa can be understood on two levels. On the first level, Paris seeks to present itself as an actor attempting to rebuild its relations with Africa on the basis of “equal partnership,” “mutual investment,” and “respect for sovereignty,” moving away from the hierarchical and interventionist “Françafrique” model of the past. In particular, the language used by Macron in Nairobi suggests that France is trying to develop a more flexible relationship model based on economics, technology, energy, and investment networks rather than military interventions and a security-centered approach. However, on the second level, this discourse has emerged at a time when France’s historical sphere of influence in Africa is narrowing, when it is losing military influence in the Sahel, and when new actors—especially China—are rapidly increasing their presence across the continent. Therefore, the new Africa approach advocated by Paris today is not only part of an effort to confront its colonial past, but also part of a strategy to preserve and reproduce its influence capacity within a changing geopolitical environment. Indeed, France’s shift from direct power projection through military bases to a lower-visibility influence model shaped around investment and economic networks is one of the clearest indicators of this strategic transformation.
It is also important to note that African states are not passive actors in this process. At the Nairobi Summit, African leaders emphasized issues such as credit rating systems, borrowing costs, and inequalities within the international financial architecture, demonstrating that the continent is no longer merely a recipient of aid but is positioning itself as an actor capable of challenging the global economic order. Many African countries, once seen as largely dependent on Western actors in the post–Cold War era, are now developing more multidimensional foreign policy strategies by benefiting from the competition among China, Russia, the Gulf states, and Western countries. This situation provides African states not only with alternative economic and military partners, but also with greater diplomatic room for maneuver vis-à-vis external actors. Indeed, the rise of sovereignty discourses in Sahel countries in recent years, public reactions against foreign military presence, and the establishment of new security partnerships demonstrate that Africa is no longer merely a passive arena of great power competition. Kenyan President William Ruto’s emphasis on “equal partnership, not dependency” is also part of this new political language.[v] Therefore, the transformation currently taking place in France’s Africa policy is related not only to Paris’s loss of influence, but also to the evolution of African states into more autonomous actors capable of renegotiating their relations with external powers.
In conclusion, the transformation currently taking place in Africa cannot be explained solely as a narrow foreign policy shift related to France losing military bases or seeking new economic partnerships. The deeper transformation lies in the changing nature of how influence is produced within the international system and in the redefinition of Africa’s position within this transformation. This also signals a change in the nature of global power competition itself. Macron’s criticism of China is therefore not merely diplomatic rhetoric, but a reflection of a new era in which economic networks have become central to geopolitical competition. In this context, the Nairobi Summit can be interpreted not only as France’s attempt to redefine its role in Africa, but also as an indicator of broader structural transformations taking place within the international system. Because today, the issue is no longer simply which actor has the greater military presence in Africa, but which actor is capable of building more sustainable economic, technological, and diplomatic networks with African countries.
[i] “Deals and new partnerships on menu at Africa-France summit”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/deals-new-partnerships-menu-africa-france-summit-2026-05-11/, (Date Accessed: 18.05.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “Macron announces €23 billion of investment at Africa summit”, Le Monde, https://shorturl.at/xOzxy, (Date Accessed: 18.05.2026).
[iv] “Macron says France outpaced in Africa by China, Türkiye, US”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/macron-says-france-outpaced-in-africa-by-china-turkiye-us/3937994, (Date Accessed: 18.05.2026).
[v] “African leaders urge credit reforms at Nairobi summit with France”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-leaders-urge-credit-reforms-nairobi-summit-with-france-2026-05-12/, (Date Accessed: 18.05.2026).
