On April 2, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to discuss the situation in the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, stating that Iran’s actions were endangering global economic stability.[1] At first glance, this statement could be viewed as an analysis of the security situation. However, when examined from a broader perspective, it becomes clear that the statement adopts a simplistic approach.
Indeed, while the crisis in the Middle East, which began with an attack on Iran by the United States (U.S.) and Israel and deepened due to Iran’s moves in the Strait of Hormuz, is a complex power struggle that cannot be explained solely by Iran’s actions;[2] Commission President von der Leyen is directly targeting Iran. Positioning Iran as an actor that threatens global supply in the context of the Strait of Hormuz primarily transforms the crisis from a regional tension into a matter of global economic security. This transformation allows a crisis occurring geographically outside Europe to be redefined as an issue requiring direct involvement. However, this redefinition alone is insufficient. In other words, the threat posed by Iran creates risks for the global economy, particularly regarding energy and trade, and a narrative is being built that something must be done; yet the EU is an actor that cannot act rapidly militarily, faces disagreements among member states, and has limited capacity for joint intervention.
At this point, it is important to highlight the United Kingdom through the statement “we will work together with our partners” in the statement. Von der Leyen clearly states that the United Kingdom is wanted to be kept at the center of the European security order despite being outside the EU. It is understood that there is no intention for the institutional rupture that occurred after Brexit to turn into a total separation in the security sphere. The United Kingdom’s military capabilities, intelligence network, and organic ties to the transatlantic system make it an irreplaceable security actor for Europe. Therefore, the emphasis on engagement with Starmer shows that Europe has adopted an approach that includes London in its security architecture rather than excluding it.
The main issue is the context in which this integration will take place. The EU has long been debating efforts to make its foreign policy and defense capabilities independent within the scope of strategic autonomy. However, this goal gives rise to Atlantic-centered security reflexes when high-intensity geopolitical crises arise. The emphasis on the United Kingdom in Ursula von der Leyen’s rhetoric highlights this breaking point. The dialogue with Starmer indicates that the NATO-Atlantic alliance is the primary reference point for Europe’s crisis management. In other words, within the debate between pro-European actors defending an autonomous security approach and Atlanticists prioritizing alignment with the Atlantic alliance, the Atlanticist preference appears to have strengthened in the institutional context.
In addition, the statement points to the United Kingdom as a suitable actor capable of translating the rhetoric about Iran being portrayed as a threat into operational action. This is because the United Kingdom has a relatively strong navy and military capabilities, experience conducting operations in regions such as the Strait of Hormuz, and the ability to act in close military coordination with the United States. At the same time, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued a statement on March 2, 2026, indicating that steps would be taken, including supporting necessary and proportionate defensive measures aimed at neutralizing Iran’s missile and UAV launch capabilities at their source.[3] The statement by these countries, known as the E3, has raised the possibility of intervention against Iran. In particular, the United Kingdom’s decision on March 20 to open its bases to the United States,[4] demonstrates that the E3’s rhetoric has quickly been transformed into actual operational capacity on the ground. Later, the Commission’s statement under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen can be seen not as initiating the process in question, but as an effort to establish the institutional and normative framework for the emerging approach. Therefore, the emphasis on the United Kingdom in the statement, which portrays Iran as a threat, is not coincidental but directly related.
In a crisis where the EU cannot come up with a solution on its own, the gap between rhetoric and operational capacity is being closed through the UK. This situation also provides a general perspective on how the disconnect between rhetoric and action in Europe’s security efforts is being managed.
Of course, this scenario could be interpreted as a previously planned, closed operational agreement. After all, there is no definitive joint military operation between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the Strait of Hormuz. However, considering the close historical military and strategic cooperation between the two countries, it is believed that any potential intervention would occur under U.S.-UK coordination. Therefore, the United Kingdom’s position in this process must be carefully assessed.
Given the broader picture, it is clear that the EU’s role in this equation will be that of a provider of a rhetorical and normative framework rather than that of a military actor.[5] For while the majority of member states maintain a prudent stance that does not support a military initiative, the Commission is engaging in a discourse that aligns with the United States’ operational and political objectives. The Commission is doing this without attempting to reshape member states’ policies or using its own capabilities to make the decision to intervene on the ground; instead, it is using rhetorical and normative tools to provide indirect legitimacy to the US and the UK. Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement does not contain a direct request for military action. By using broad and general statements such as “freedom of navigation must be ensured,” she shifts the call for intervention to an indirect and normative level. Thus, the UK’s potential support for intervention is portrayed as a legitimate and expected initiative within the framework of international norms.
In fact, when Iran is defined as a “threat,” intervention becomes not an abnormal but a rational and necessary option. The emphasis on freedom of navigation also legitimizes military or security-based measures at critical transit points like the Strait of Hormuz by linking them to the protection of the international order. This rhetorical strategy ensures that when actors such as the United Kingdom take action on the ground, their steps are seen as initiatives based on normative consensus rather than unilateral and isolated interventions. It also provides the Commission with an opportunity to guide the actions of actors on the ground. By framing Iran as a “threat” to global economic stability, this rhetoric allows the crisis to be defined as a matter of collective security without calling for direct military engagement by the EU. In this context, the Union avoids taking on the actual responsibility for a potential intervention but contributes to its justification.
As a result, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement is viewed not so much as a statement reflecting an existing European position, but rather as a rhetorical tool that shapes the framework for potential interventions and legitimizes the roles of specific actors. In this sense, von der Leyen is constructing a threat narrative around Iran and indirectly indicating which actors will be involved in what security architecture to counter this threat. In this architecture, where the Atlanticist security approach takes the lead, the United Kingdom emerges as the representative of operational capacity, while the EU serves as the actor producing discursive legitimacy.
[1] Ilayda Cakirtekin, “EU vows to work with partners to ensure freedom of navigation in Hormuz”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-vows-to-work-with-partners-to-ensure-freedom-of-navigation-in-hormuz/3888911, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[2] Gamze Bal, “Hürmüz Boğazı ve paradoksal güç inşası”, Tercüman, https://www.tercuman.com/analiz/hurmuz-bogazi-ve-paradoksal-guc-insasi-2776, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[3] Şeyma Yiğit, “Fransa, İngiltere ve Almanya, İran’ın füze fırlatma kapasitesini imhaya yönelik ‘savunma eylemlerine’ hazır”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/fransa-ingiltere-ve-almanya-iran-in-fuze-firlatma-kapasitesini-imhaya-yonelik-savunma-eylemlerine-hazir/3845722, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[4] İngiltere, “Hürmüz Boğazı’nı hedef alan saldırılarda ABD’ye üslerini açma kararı aldı”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c77mlg3j3l2o, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
[5] Şerife Çetin, “ABD’nin İran saldırılarını “kendi savaşı” görmeyen Avrupa liderleri, temkinli tavırlarını sürdürüyor”, Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/abdnin-iran-saldirilarini-kendi-savasi-gormeyen-avrupa-liderleri-temkinli-tavirlarini-surduruyor/3889010, (Date Accessed: 02.04.2026).
