French President Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy vision aims to revitalize France’s global influence which has waned in the post-Cold War era and to position the European Union (EU) along the lines of a Paris-centered “strategic autonomy”. However, his efforts to overcome domestic political gridlock through “aggressive” and “showboating” moves in foreign policy are turning France into a party to regional crises rather than a “global balancer.”
Indeed, at this stage, Paris’s expansionist strategy which encompasses North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus including the agreements it most recently signed with Damascus and its military support for Armenia in the Caucasus, has begun to clash not only with the US’s “New Middle East” blueprint which targets the Caucasus and beyond but also, undoubtedly, with Türkiye’s geopolitical sphere of influence and its national security concerns. If left unchecked, tension in bilateral relations with the countries in question appears inevitable.
Beyond this, Macron’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” centered in Paris has begun to create deep divisions and rifts in Brussels and at the heart of the EU. His direct confrontation with Türkiye’s regional sovereignty through military and geopolitical moves on the ground is now being viewed as a blow to the foundations of the EU’s new security architecture.
It has not gone unnoticed that the rift within the EU/Europe has begun to deepen and widen further with the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the equation. In this context, as Macron’s nation-state-centric approach comes into conflict with the spirit of EU integration, it is evident that this stance is taking on a nature that sabotages Europe’s security efforts including its “security architecture” which seek to incorporate Türkiye in some way. In this regard, the issue transcends France; Macron’s stance fundamentally reveals the potential to transform the “Western Problem” into a regional and global crisis by bringing it back into the arena of world politics.
France: A “Troubled Return” to Historical Codes
It draws attention that Macron’s foreign policy architecture which has come to the fore in recent years as part of the “Four-Front Mediterranean and Levant Strategy” has taken shape at the intersection of France’s historical colonial spheres of influence and new energy-security corridors. In this context, while Macron is struggling with crises caused by “memory diplomacy” an approach based on historical baggage that has backfired in “North Africa” with Algeria and Morocco France’s credibility on the ground in Libya also appears to have been undermined due to the illegitimate support provided to actors such as Khalifa Haftar.
Paris, which aims to encircle Türkiye in its “Blue Homeland” strategy by forming military alliances with Greece and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (GRC) in the “Eastern Mediterranean,” has also been unable to avoid being sidelined from the region’s energy dynamics. In fact, even Italy is now emerging as a rising actor with greater standing than France, thanks to the rational and pragmatic policies it has pursued. Frankly, Italy appears to owe this largely to Macron.
In the context of the “Middle East and the Caucasus” Paris which is attempting to revive its role as a “protective power” in Lebanon and Syria has focused on sabotaging the regional integration led by Azerbaijan and Türkiye (such as the Zangezur Corridor) and, beyond that, the 3+3 format by providing direct military support to Armenia in the Caucasus. France stands on the same side as India and Israel in this regard. However, it seems highly unlikely that Israel acting as a behind the scenes player alongside the duo of India and France will be able to achieve any results through Yerevan in the coming process. After all, the pieces have not yet fallen into place.
For this reason, all three countries appear likely to once again deploy a set of outdated strategies which have lost their effectiveness through their lobbies in the US and Europe, as well as through the Armenian Diaspora/Lobby. In fact, Israel has already tried this, but it ran headlong into the “Azerbaijani Wall” in a way it never anticipated. This actually demonstrates that all three actors including Israel are operating on the basis of flawed geopolitical assessments.
Therefore, ıt ıs as plain as day. Indeed, as an inevitable consequence of Macron’s ambitious policy, France is being drawn deeper into the vortex of regional crises with each passing day, and the more it struggles, the further it sinks. Indeed, France is being declared an “unwelcome actor” in many of its former colonies, particularly in Africa. In the coming period, it would come as no surprise if Africa were to be followed by the Arab Middle East, centered on Lebanon and Syria. The issue seems to be merely a matter of timing.
Macron’s Visit to Damascus and the Escalating Dynamics of the Conflict
Macron’s visit to Syria on July 7, 2026, is the most concrete and recent manifestation of this ambition. Macron, who met in Damascus with Interim President Ahmed al-Shara who took office following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 became the first Western European leader to visit Syria. Despite bomb attacks occurring near the hotel where Macron was staying during his visit, his refusal to back down and his decision to visit the Umayyad Mosque have been interpreted as a declaration of the return of French colonialist codes targeting the Levant region.
As a matter of fact, France which signed 15 bilateral agreements in Damascus covering civil aviation, banking, and infrastructure is investing in Syria’s claim to serve as a trade bridge for the Middle East via its Mediterranean ports. France’s efforts to strengthen its relations with Syria and the Damascus government’s response to this are, of course, in line with the normal course of international relations. What is inappropriate, however, is that France has, up until now, pursued a policy based on Syria’s territorial integrity and thus its division primarily through separatist groups such as the PYD/YPG/SDG/PKK. Paris’s failure to send even a strong message or even a signal that it has abandoned its goal of dividing Syria along ethnic and sectarian lines continues to be the primary concern of regional countries, particularly the Damascus government.
Consequently, it is possible to guess what the new relationship process that Paris has been developing with Damascus aims to achieve. In this context, the following argument does not seem unfounded at all: While Ankara prioritizes Syria’s territorial integrity and the eradication of terrorism, Paris is attempting to limit Türkiye’s presence along its southern border by bringing the Damascus regime over to its side. Indeed, Macron’s move to travel directly from Damascus to the NATO Summit in Ankara has been interpreted as an attempt to play the “Syria card” against Türkiye.
This ambiguous stance, along with potential thoughts and actions that cannot be viewed as friendly, has the potential to lead not only Türkiye-France relations but also France-Arab Middle East and US-France relations toward a troubled and risky future within the regional context.
On the other hand, there is one point Macron has overlooked: The Damascus regime’s strategic thinking runs very deep, and it is well aware of France’s “Kurdish and Nusayri cards.” It also has a strong historical memory of France’s tendency to play these cards when the time is right, and much has changed since then.
The “France Crack” in Türkiye-EU Relations
France’s “aggressive”, “provocative”, and “encircling” policy in Türkiye’s immediate vicinity is placing Türkiye-EU relations in a bilateral vise.In this context, the following three issues come to the surface :
- “Security Smart Institutionalization”: France is attempting to bring Türkiye’s counterterrorism efforts and cross-border operations into the EU framework in order to impose collective sanctions or condemnations on Ankara.
- “Polarization Within NATO”: Macron’s efforts to portray Türkiye as a destabilizing actor within NATO an alliance he once described as having “suffered brain death” along with his moves regarding the Greek Cypriot Administration, are creating a serious rift in the alliance’s southern flank.
- “Defence Industry Balance”: Despite France’s containment policy, comments from certain lobbies within the EU and even from French defense analysts that “France has fallen into Erdoğan’s air defense diplomacy trap” indicate that Paris’s strategic moves have not been fully supported by the Western alliance.
Independence from Brussels and Deep Divisions Within the EU
Macron’s moves to reshape the political landscape are based on a strategy that is largely independent of the EU bureaucracy in Brussels and aims to advance French national interests under the guise of the EU. However, there is serious concern within the Union about these policies, as well as a latent resistance that will become apparent over time.
In this context, Germany believing that Paris’s military adventures have harmed the EU budget and trade is taking a distanced and critical stance toward Macron’s policies; while its approach to Türkiye is based on economic rationality, it maintains on its agenda a deepened, security-focused political cooperation, although not as clearly defined as it was during the Merkel era.
Spain, meanwhile, is adopting a cautious and trade-focused position, as it does not want tensions to escalate in the Mediterranean, and is maintaining good relations with Ankara regarding migration management and regional trade.
The most overt opposition to and competition with France, however, comes from Italy; the government in Rome does not trust France at all, particularly in Libya and North Africa, and views French colonialist tendencies as a direct threat to its own interests.
Poland, located to the east of the Union, has adopted a critical and security-focused stance, criticizing Paris’s focus on the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a diversion of resources from the EU’s border with Russia the primary threat.
The UK’s London-Based Pragmatic Response
The United Kingdom, another major military, political, and financial power in Europe, is taking a highly pragmatic and skeptical approach to Macron’s display of “strategic autonomy” in the post-Brexit era. London views Macron’s unilateral moves in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean specifically regarding Cyprus as an effort by continental Europe to assert its influence in the Mediterranean.
While the United Kingdom focuses on maintaining its bases in Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean in line with its “Global Britain” vision, it prefers to deepen its strategic and military cooperation with Türkiye in the Caucasus and the Middle East.
In response to the trade agreements Macron signed in Damascus, London is monitoring the situation using its financial, political/diplomatic, and intelligence capabilities without upsetting the regional balance of power, while closely tracking France’s excessive military and diplomatic expansion. On the other hand, London’s shift from a “wait-and-see” strategy to a “preemptive strategy” appears to be only a matter of time.
Trump’s “New Middle East” Design and the Limits of French Destination
The Trump administration’s approach to Macron’s move on Syria and his unilateral policies in the Levant marks a sharp dividing line. Washington is pursuing a process of building a pragmatic “US Middle East”in opposition to the “European Middle East” which is synonymous with the Sykes-Picot agreement by shaping its strategy around the “Abraham Accords” and relying on the logistical and security integration of Gulf capital with Israel.
Therefore, while Trump’s “America First” doctrine advocates for allies to shoulder their own security costs, it views with skepticism the commitments Macron has made driven by his eagerness to fill a geopolitical vacuum in Syria and his rhetoric of “strategic autonomy.” The White House interprets these moves by France not as a partnership with the American vision, but as a resurgence of an anachronistic French colonialist reflex that undermines Washington’s interests in the region and disrupts cohesion within NATO.
This situation has the potential to have critical consequences for transatlantic relations and the balance of power on the ground. First, at a time when the US is pursuing a strategy of military withdrawal from the Middle East or burden-sharing, Macron’s excessive expansion in the region could drag France into a financial and military impasse. Second, Trump’s approach to trade and rational diplomacy which facilitates geopolitical negotiations with Türkiye, the country that holds the real military power on the ground could push France to the sidelines. Consequently, the sphere of influence Paris is attempting to establish via Damascus may conflict with the US energy corridor project; this could lead to France’s diplomatic isolation from both Washington and Ankara which ensures stability in the region and result in deep isolation within the Western alliance.
The End of “Sykes-Picot”- The Return of Historical Geopolitics
Macron’s “neo-Napoleonic” foreign policy line, which reached its peak with his visit to Damascus, has begun to confront France with the realities on the ground rather than propelling it to European leadership. Indeed, along this ambitious axis stretching from North Africa to the Caucasus, “Macron’s France” is clashing with Türkiye’s rising role as a balancing power a country with the region’s most deeply rooted state tradition and military strength while also sending strong signals that it is poised to experience deep discord and “confrontation” with Trump’s “New Middle East” vision at any moment.
In other words, As part of Macron’s ambitious policies, which span from the regional to the global level, the “New Great Game” he has set in motion could come into direct conflict at any moment with the “Trump-Erdoğan Duo/Balance” or another actor’s “wait-and-see” strategy in “Expanded Central Eurasia,” centered on the Levant.
In this context, given the possibility that this process could further deepen the crises between Europe/the EU and the US, we are seeing a French foreign policy that major players within the EU such as Germany and Italy do not endorse, while the United Kingdom is observing from a distance. This policy is characterized as a geopolitical gamble that is disconnected from Brussels, out of step with its allies, and unsustainable.
Therefore Paris, which has chosen to isolate Türkiye rather than cooperate with it, may ultimately find itself on the sidelines of the regional and global equation. To this end, it will be more than sufficient for France to look to its historical memory and, in this context, examine the disappointments it experienced following the “Sykes-Picot-(Sazanov) Secret Agreement,” as well as the balance of power in Syria before and after December 2024.
In Conclusion: Viewing the Evolving Geopolitical Landscape Through a “New Lens”
For this reason, while the bilateral agreements signed with Syria may be viewed as an effort by France to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean through “soft power” elements, it appears highly likely that Paris will face a “strategic backlash” and, subsequently, “isolation” in the face of the Trump administration’s vision of a “New Middle East” or “US Middle East” centered on the “Abraham Accords.” Furthermore, Macron’s pursuits which do not present a particularly coherent picture in the context of “policy-strategy-tools” carry the potential to affect French domestic politics, particularly the far right, due to the excessive military and financial burden they will impose on France.
To put it conclusion, we are now entering a new era in which US-Türkiye relations are being redefined in the context of the US’s tendency to cooperate with rational actors in the region. Macron’s recent moves to return to historical patterns, particularly within the strategic triangle of “the Republic of Cyprus/Eastern Mediterranean,” “Lebanon-Syria/Middle East,” and “Armenia/Caucasus,” have clearly come under scrutiny. In the changing and evolving global geopolitical landscape, Macron’s ability to interpret, understand, and track the process of building a new world order through his “new lens” will serve not only France’s interests but also those of the entire region and the world. Otherwise, a second “African tragedy” appears inevitable from France’s perspective.
