Germany’s proposal to grant Ukraine “associate member” status prior to full membership in the European Union (EU) has reignited debates in Europe regarding Ukraine’s future. While Berlin’s proposal may initially appear to be a pragmatic interim solution aimed at integrating Ukraine into European institutions more quickly, the issue is directly linked to the EU’s geopolitical capacity, institutional limits, and war economy. Particularly when considering the “Zeitenwende (Historical Turning Point)” rhetoric Germany declared during the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine War, Berlin’s current shift toward more controlled and phased integration models is noteworthy.
During the war’s early phase, Germany’s heavy arms support for Ukraine, the increase in its defense budget, and the hardening of its security rhetoric were interpreted as signaling Berlin’s transformation into a more geopolitical actor. However, the current picture reveals that the tension between Germany’s security rhetoric and its institutional-economic reflexes has resurfaced. This situation underscores that the transformation in Germany’s Ukraine policy must be interpreted not only as a security issue but also as a matter of cost management and institutional stability.
The “joint membership” model proposed by Berlin can be viewed as an interim status formula aimed at gradually integrating Ukraine into the system—in the areas of security, economy, and institutional integration—prior to full membership in the European Union.[i] While this model envisions Ukraine’s deeper integration into the European market, defense cooperation mechanisms, and certain common policy areas, it is notable that full representation in the EU’s decision-making body, the right of veto, and equal authority over budgetary mechanisms are deferred. In other words, while Germany supports including Ukraine in Europe’s security framework and economic sphere, it adopts a more controlled and phased approach regarding full integration into the Union’s political center. This is because Ukraine’s full membership is not merely a decision on political expansion; it also signifies a structural transformation that will directly impact the EU’s current budget structure, veto mechanism, agricultural funds, and power balances. Therefore, from Germany’s perspective, the issue is not merely whether Ukraine belongs to Europe; it is about under what terms, at what cost, and at what pace Ukraine will be integrated into the European system.
Kiev’s swift rejection of this formula makes perfect sense precisely at this point. For Ukraine, the war is not merely a struggle for territorial integrity, but a struggle to become a full and equal actor in Europe’s political and security architecture. It is not surprising that Kiev views a model that does not grant veto power or full representation—particularly in critical areas such as security, the budget, and foreign policy—as “second-class integration.” For the Ukrainian government, integration into Europe means not merely economic convergence but being recognized as an “equal sovereign actor” within Europe’s decision-making mechanisms. Consequently, there is a significant divergence in vision between Berlin’s model of phased, controlled integration and Kyiv’s demand for full institutional sovereignty.
This situation also highlights the asymmetry in perceptions regarding European security. From Berlin’s perspective, Ukraine serves as a critical buffer zone for European security and acts as a strategic buffer against Russia. However, while Germany wants Ukraine to shoulder this security burden, it is more cautious about integrating Ukraine into the European decision-making center to the same extent. In other words, Berlin seeks to integrate Ukraine into Europe’s security perimeter but is wary of the institutional consequences that full integration into the political center would entail. Thus, Ukraine is beginning to function less as a member fully integrated on the basis of full political equality and more as a “strategic border zone” providing security depth against Russia. For this reason, the “joint membership” proposal can be viewed not merely as a technical membership model but also as an attempt to reproduce Europe’s center-periphery relations.
A significant portion of Berlin’s reservations concerns the defense economy and budget management. The full membership of a country like Ukraine—with its large population, extensive agricultural capacity, and massive post-war reconstruction needs—could place a serious strain on the Union’s current financial structure. Particularly when considering the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Funds, Ukraine’s membership has the potential to fundamentally alter the balance of resource allocation. According to joint reports published by the World Bank, the European Commission, and the United Nations, the cost of Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction is expected to exceed hundreds of billions of dollars.[ii] This table shows that, for net contributor countries like Germany, Ukraine’s membership would entail not only a political but also a long-term financial burden.
One of Berlin’s primary structural concerns is the risk of institutional paralysis. At a time when actors like Hungary can already slow down EU decision-making processes by using veto mechanisms, the inclusion of a large, security-focused actor like Ukraine could complicate Germany’s ability to steer the Union. In particular, the growing influence of Eastern European countries pursuing security-focused policies in the post-war era could render the traditional steering capacity of the Germany-France axis within the EU more fragile. If the unanimity requirement persists in foreign policy and security matters, Ukraine’s veto power could create new vulnerabilities in European decision-making processes. Therefore, Berlin’s proposal for “associate membership” can be interpreted not only as a process to prepare Ukraine but also as a strategy to preserve the EU’s current institutional structure and spread out potential shifts in power over time.
The contrast between French President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier proposal for a European Political Community (EPC) and Berlin’s approach to Ukraine is striking. Macron’s vision for the EPC was initially a broader strategic project aimed at bringing together European countries outside the EU—particularly Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the Western Balkans—under a common geopolitical framework.[iii] From Paris’s perspective, this model was an attempt to extend Europe’s security and geopolitical capabilities beyond the EU’s current institutional boundaries. However, the “shared membership” approach recently developed by Berlin is transforming this vision into a more controlled and bureaucratic instrument of integration. In other words, Germany is adapting Macron’s idea of geopolitical inclusivity into a “waiting room” model that would incorporate Ukraine into the European security sphere while keeping it to some extent removed from the Union’s financial obligations and decision-making center. Consequently, Berlin’s proposal is not merely a temporary membership model; it can also be interpreted as a new hierarchical form of integration aimed at integrating peripheral countries into the system through the security burden while preserving the decision-making capacity of core European countries.
Consequently, the “shared membership” formula can be viewed as a new iteration of the “multi-speed Europe” concept that has become increasingly visible in recent years.[iv] However, what is striking here is that Ukraine, by rejecting this model at an early stage, has clearly demonstrated that it does not wish to be part of a hierarchical integration system within Europe. From Kyiv’s perspective, given the heavy costs and security burden imposed by the war, integrating into Europe merely as a security perimeter does not appear sufficient. Ukraine does not wish to accept the role of a “geopolitical satellite” that bears Europe’s security burden but is not fully included in decision-making processes. This model carries the risk of creating an asymmetric integration framework that seeks to distribute security risks to neighboring countries while retaining decision-making capacity within core Europe.
Ultimately, Germany’s proposal for “associate membership” for Ukraine highlights the growing gap between the European Union’s rhetoric on normative expansion and geopolitical and economic realities. The Ukraine Crisis demonstrates that EU enlargement is no longer merely a matter of democratic transformation and political convergence; it has transformed into a direct issue of security, budget management, and power-sharing. This situation also brings back to the forefront the question of how sustainable the EU’s long-held identity as a “Normative Power Europe” is when faced with geopolitical and economic costs. Therefore, the fundamental question facing Europe today is not whether Ukraine belongs to Europe, but whether Europe possesses the institutional and political capacity to fully integrate Ukraine. The tension between Berlin’s pursuit of controlled integration and Kyiv’s demand for full sovereignty will continue to be one of the most critical fault lines in Europe’s security architecture in the coming period.
[i] “L’Allemagne veut accorder à l’Ukraine un statut de ‘membre associé’ avant son adhésion à l’Union européenne”, France24, https://shorturl.at/OWMnp, (Date of Acccession: 25.05.2026).
[ii] “Ukraine – Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022- December 2025”, World Bank Group, Government of Ukraine, European Commission, United Nations, https://www.undp.org/ukraine/publications/ukraine-fifth-rapid-damage-and-needs-assessment-rdna5-february-2022-december-2025, (Date of Acccession: 25.05.2026).
[iii] Emmanuel Macron, “Conference on the Future of Europe Closing Ceremony Speech”, European Parliament, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/05/09/closure-of-the-conference-on-the-future-of-europe, (Date of Acccession: 25.05.2026).
[iv] “White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025”, European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2017-03/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf, (Date of Acccession: 25.05.2026).
