While negotiations were ongoing between the United States and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the subsequent attacks by Israel and later by the United States constituted a clear example of the Trump-Netanyahu duo once again setting aside diplomacy and disregarding both the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the principle governing it. The Tel Aviv-Washington agenda has, contrary to official statements, never been limited to opening Iran’s nuclear program to international inspection or preventing the use of its ballistic missiles. In other words, the objective appears to have been the continuation of instability and conflict in the Middle East, alongside a regime change in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, the calls by Trump and Netanyahu urging the Iranian people to rise up revealed the real agenda. This process has shown that not only in the Middle East but also globally, the system and the political approach pursued within it are intended to be reshaped, and that international law is not being invoked in the emerging framework. In addition, the manner in which Trump initiated the war was not only contrary to international law but also inconsistent with the United States Constitution.
International law, particularly during the twentieth century when its development accelerated, evolved under the influence of international politics and the needs of the international community. As reflected in both the diversification of actors and the expansion of its content, international law has developed over time. This evolution is also evident in changing approaches to the use of force. The prohibition of the threat or use of force did not emerge suddenly but developed gradually through various stages. Since 1945, this prohibition has been enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and has acquired the character of a jus cogens norm.
The process evolved from a period in which the use of force was regarded as a sign of sovereignty and a right, to its limitation under the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919, and to the rejection of war as an instrument through the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. Before 1945, the use of force had been restricted but not prohibited. The prohibition was introduced with the United Nations Charter. However, the current situation suggests a return to the initial stage of this historical process and to a paradigm of the law of the strong.
The attacks carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February demonstrate that even controversial principles occasionally invoked in international law, such as the Responsibility to Protect, were not considered necessary. Although Israel attempted to justify its first strike by referring to a preventive attack, this approach is inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and with the right of self-defense set out in Article 51.
From the perspective of United States domestic law, the use of force ordered by Trump also constitutes a violation of the United States Constitution. If the actions are classified as acts of war, they do not fall within a category that the President may authorize unilaterally under his authority as Commander in Chief. Rather, they fall within a category that requires the approval of the United States Congress.
Since the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in a United States strike in Iraq in 2020, the strength of the Iranian regime has increasingly been questioned. After 7 October 2023, Israel’s attacks also targeted Iran’s proxies. Thus, the questioning of Iran’s power was no longer limited to Iran but spread across the Middle East. The deaths of Hezbollah’s leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, in Israeli strikes in Lebanon raised doubts about Iran’s intelligence capacity.
A similar interpretation was voiced after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, at the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran. During the twelve day June 2025 War, Iran’s deterrence and operational capacity were tested by the United States and Israel. In other words, Iran has suffered successive setbacks. During this period, the threats directed at Iran by the Trump-Netanyahu duo have dominated the global agenda. In an environment of increasing tension and uncertainty, Iran chose to return to negotiations and emphasized its commitment to international law.
While it was expected that developments would proceed within a legal framework at the negotiating table, the most significant blow came on the first day of the war. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the most powerful and central figure of the system, was killed on 28 February in a joint United States and Israeli attack. The most influential and central figure representing opposition to the United States and Israel has thus been removed from the equation. At a time when his health condition and possible succession scenarios were already being discussed, Khamenei became the target of an assassination. Following the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, attention had turned to Khamenei’s son. The targeting of key regime figures on the first day of the attacks aimed to test not only Iran’s deterrence but also its resilience. The rapid appointment of a new leader and the replacement of the killed Chief of General Staff will be critical for the continuity of the system.
In the current phase, Trump has stated that the war initiated by the United States and Israel may continue for days or even weeks. His direct appeals to the Iranian public and the language he used when announcing Khamenei’s death indicate a focus on regime change or at least on the elimination of the leadership of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the entire country does not appear to be the primary target. Rather, strategic locations are expected to remain the main targets. Uranium facilities are among the primary targets in this context. Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles and launch systems may also be destroyed.
Iran’s ballistic missile program had been one of the main reasons for Trump’s opposition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded during the Obama administration. Describing this omission as a major deficiency, Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement. In the 2026 negotiations, Washington sought the inclusion of issues such as ballistic missiles. The United States aims to reach a framework different from the previous agreement. However, Tehran opposed the inclusion of missiles in the negotiations, arguing that they play a key role in its defense.
Diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the legal status of Iran’s nuclear program through an international agreement once again bring the issue to the relationship between international law and international relations. Efforts to limit nuclear weapons emerged during the Cold War and were institutionalized through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, which entered into force in 1970. According to the treaty, no state other than the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom may possess nuclear weapons. Iran has been a party to this treaty since 1970 and has stated that it remains committed to its obligations. In contrast, Israel is widely known to possess nuclear capabilities.
The prohibition of the threat or use of force in international law is directly linked to negotiations as a peaceful means of dispute settlement. In the Iranian case, however, the United States and Israel shifted to the use of force while negotiations were ongoing. As noted above, the objective appears to have moved beyond diplomacy toward regime change. By invoking the concept of a preventive strike, Israel attempted to legitimize its violation of the prohibition of the use of force. This doctrine, which focuses on the expectation of a future attack, remains highly contested. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the use of force becomes lawful only when specific conditions are met, the most important of which is the occurrence of an armed attack.
If the joint United States-Israeli operation is evaluated within the framework of Article 51, it constitutes a violation of the right of self-defense and therefore of the prohibition of the use of force. Both the United States and Israel have previously justified attacks against various countries by invoking preventive self-defense. The 2003 United States invasion of Iraq and Israel’s 1981 strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor are examples of this approach. Israel’s previous strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities were also justified in the same manner.
In conclusion, it appears that the objective has not been merely to pressure Iran at the negotiating table. Similar to previous cases, statements by Trump suggest that a new leadership and a new political order in Iran aligned with United States and Israeli interests are being sought. For this purpose, international law is once again openly violated. In a period marked by discussions of a paradigm shift in the international system, particularly in the Middle East, the prominence of international law appears unlikely in the short, medium, and long term. Iran’s isolation had already been placed at the center of the regional agenda during Trump’s first term through the Deal of the Century. Rather than resolving the Palestinian issue, Israel was integrated into the region through a shared opposition to Iran. This approach was implemented through the Abraham Accords, under which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates normalized relations with Israel and identified Iran as a common threat. In Trump’s second term, this framework appears to be implemented through war.
