The institutional multilateral security architecture constructed after the Second World War is facing a profound structural crisis in the third decade of the twenty-first century. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the monolithic, single-centered and global-scale alliance structure of the Cold War era, is struggling to respond to today’s multipolar, asymmetric and rapidly localized security threats. This institutional inertia, together with the new dynamics of global power competition, has triggered a process referred to in the international relations literature as “Regional NATO-ization,” or, with a more critical conceptualization, “Regional NATOs/mini-NATOs” (mini-lateralism). This process appears likely to come to the fore as the key structure in NATO’s transformation, centered on a hybrid restructuring against hybrid threats.
In this context, it has become unavoidable to dwell further on the issue of “Regional NATOs/mini-NATOs,” which I partially addressed in the studies discussed in my previous two articles, (“New NATO” and the “2026 Ankara Summit”: An Existential Story in the International System under Reconstruction; and NATO as an Alliance in a “Two-Axis Pincer”: The “2026 Ankara Summit” and Strategies for Exiting the Crisis)
At this point, the following definition of “Regional NATOs/mini-NATOs” would, I believe, not be very inaccurate: instead of massive structures containing collective defense commitments on a global scale, they refer to “micro military alliances” or “niche security coalitions” established by a small number of states that share a common threat perception in a specific geographical basin, such as the Asia-Pacific, the Arctic, or the Baltic region, possess high military capacities and have flexible decision-making mechanisms.
Although this process undoubtedly does not mean the formal dissolution of NATO, it also carries the potential to deeply shake the organization’s functional backbone, command-and-control chain and, most importantly, the principle of collective deterrence embodied in Article 5.
In this comprehensive analysis, the process of regional NATO-ization is examined through the strategic approaches, expectations, reactions and possible military-logistical contributions of the main pillars of the transatlantic alliance: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and the member states of the European Union. The possible structural effects of this wave of micro-alliances on NATO’s institutional future are also addressed from the perspective of 2026. In addition, the issue of “joker membership,” which has not yet directly entered the literature in the context of international relations and foreign policy, is introduced for the first time in this analysis and, albeit partially, discussed.
1. The United States: “Mini-Lateralism” as a Global Force Multiplier
For the United States, the process of “Regional NATO-ization” appears not as a “weakness” in terms of preserving its global hegemonic position, but rather as a strategic “force multiplier” and a pragmatic instrument of diplomacy; in fact, it has already been put into practice de facto. Washington is aware that it cannot confront, on its own, China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific, which it sees as the greatest geopolitical challenge of the twenty-first century, and Russia’s revisionist moves along the Eurasian periphery through the cumbersome NATO structure of 32 members. In this context, the foreign policy elites of the Pentagon and the White House are placing regional alliances on two main pillars: “burden-sharing” and “integrated deterrence.”
Through “burden-sharing,” loudly voiced by Trump, the United States essentially aims to reduce the excessive pressure of global commitments on its financial and military burden, more concretely on its defense budget. Regional partners taking on greater responsibility in their own security basins will enable Washington to optimize its military logistics. In the context of “integrated deterrence,” the micro-containment of China and Russia emerges as the United States’ most fundamental objective. The main expectation of the U.S. here is to create local, mobilized and technologically superior micro-containment circles around rival powers, rather than fighting a single war on a global scale. AUKUS (U.S.-UK-Australia), implemented in the Indo-Pacific and also described as a “Pacific NATO,” and QUAD (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) constitute concrete examples of this strategy, which I have described above as de facto beginnings.
Within QUAD, India points to the United States’ intention to use the country not only for the landward containment of China, but also as a strategic depth targeting South Asia and Central Asia in terms of power projection. The United States appears to have preferred establishing “Asian and Pacific mini-NATOs” instead of stretching NATO’s institutional boundaries into the Asia-Pacific. This also carries a greater meaning in terms of the idea of detaching India from the “Multipolar Alliance,” beyond merely seeing India as part of the “Multipolar World.”
Within the framework of these fundamental objectives, the United States provides these sub-regional formations with the highest level of military contribution, critical technological transfer and intelligence support. As seen in the case of AUKUS, the United States is opening to its sub-regional allies the nuclear-powered submarine technology and AI-based cyber defense algorithms that it has jealously guarded for decades. In addition, by making its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure available to these mini-alliances, the United States integrates local armies into its own military satellites and global data networks. It also reinforces the conventional armies of regional structures with cyberwarfare and space-based early warning systems.
2. The United Kingdom: The “Global Britain” Vision and “Flexible Power Projection”
As is known, following the Brexit process, London put into practice the “Global Britain Doctrine” in order to draw its own independent geopolitical course in the international system. In this context, for the United Kingdom, “Regional NATO-ization” offers an opportunity to return effectively to its former spheres of influence and thus to become once again a leading “political-military actor” on the global stage, without being caught up in the diplomatic or institutional obstacles posed by actors such as Brussels or Paris. On the other hand, London also views the unanimity mechanism of the official 32-member NATO structure as a “security vulnerability” in moments of urgent crisis. Possible veto decisions that countries such as Greece, Hungary or France might use in line with their national interests are pushing the United Kingdom toward narrower, ideologically and militarily homogeneous “coalitions of the willing.”
In this context, the United Kingdom has transformed the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which it commands and which includes 10 countries from the Baltic region, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, into a fully fledged “Northern European mini-NATO.” The United Kingdom’s fundamental expectation here is to respond rapidly to crises that may arise in Northern Europe and the Baltic region and to provide deterrence through this multinational military security initiative, which has rapid-response capability and a high level of readiness. In a more concrete and current sense, this appears as the establishment of an area of absolute operational dominance that would prevent Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic and Arctic sea routes. Therefore, based also on the JEF example, it can be stated that the United Kingdom aims to architect mini-pacts that will allow it to avoid massive multilateral bureaucracies, gain “diplomatic and military flexibility” and thus deploy military elements to crisis regions (such as the Ukraine-Eastern Europe line or the Taiwan Strait) within a few days.
3. Canada: “The Paradox of Multilateralism” and the “Arctic Necessity”
Ottawa’s approach to the process of “Regional NATO-ization” reflects a deep strategic paradox and a foreign policy dilemma. As a traditionally middle-sized power, Canada has always argued that it owes its national security and international weight to large, multilateral, rules-based institutional structures such as the United Nations and NATO. Therefore, every sub-regional alliance that bypasses NATO brings with it the risk of excluding Canada from global decision-making tables. In this context, the Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy carries a concern over institutional erosion, based on the view that the increase in mini-lateral formations will loosen NATO’s transatlantic unity and weaken the strategic bridge between North America and Europe. For example, Canada initially viewed being left out of the AUKUS pact as a diplomatic exclusion and adopted a cautious stance toward such exclusionary structures.
On the other hand, the only exception that breaks Canada’s institutionalist line is the Arctic region. As melting glaciers, together with climate change, began to transform the Arctic into an area of military-economic expansion for Russia and China, Canada was compelled to establish a settled “Arctic Defense Bloc” that would work together with the United States and the Scandinavian countries in this region. Therefore, although Canada has certain concerns, it is itself adopting a more pragmatic inclination in the face of realpolitik.
Indeed, instead of sending large combat fleets to sub-regional military initiatives, Canada contributes by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) infrastructure, which it jointly operates with the United States. Beyond this, the Canadian Armed Forces reinforce the northern flank of sub-regional alliances in terms of polar logistics and underwater acoustics through submarine listening stations, sonar networks, icebreaker logistics and search-and-rescue capabilities in the Arctic region.
4. EU Member States: The Search for Strategic Autonomy and Geographical Divisions
The European Union is the actor that gives the most heterogeneous, fragmented and contradictory responses to the wave of “Regional NATO-ization.” The fact that the 27 EU member states do not share a homogeneous threat perception has led to the emergence of three different main currents within the Union regarding mini-lateral military pacts: A) the “Strategic Autonomists” led by France, B) the “Transatlantic Institutionalists” represented by Germany and C) the “Urgent Deterrence Advocates” formed by Poland and the Baltic states.
A. The French Axis: “Strategic Autonomy” and “Anglo-Saxon Skepticism”
Paris regards regional mini-NATOs (especially AUKUS) as “Anglo-Saxon conspiracies” that undermine Europe’s strategic independence. Behind President Macron’s statement in an interview with The Economist in November 2019 that “NATO is brain-dead” lies this diagnosis of institutional inadequacy. In this context, France wants defense cooperation to take shape not under the guidance of NATO or the United States, but under the EU’s own institutional umbrella, with the vision of a European Army or European Defense Union. On the other hand, France is also trying to respond to Washington- and London-centered mini-alliances by activating its own regional pacts, such as bilateral defense agreements with Greece in the Mediterranean or mini military coalitions in Africa’s Sahel region.
B. The German Axis: A Soft Transition from “Transatlantic Loyalty and Institutional Conservatism” to an “EU NATO”
Until recently, Berlin appeared as an actor that, as a requirement of its traditional pacifist strategic culture and Cold War memories, had almost placed its faith in the idea that the sole and legitimate umbrella of European security should remain an “Integral NATO.” In this way, Germany was able to transfer the defense burden to the United States through NATO, guarantee its security at very little cost and allocate more of its resources to the national economy and the welfare of its people. Within this framework, Berlin was also concerned that any division or sub-alliance formation within NATO would create a perception of weakness in the deterrent front displayed against Russia, and in this direction it made every effort to prevent “Pandora’s box” from being opened.
However, with the Russia-Ukraine War and the “Trump Factor,” “Pandora’s box” has now been opened, and the Berlin administration has begun, under the name of “cooperation,” efforts to build the infrastructure of a Germany-centered EU NATO without directly confronting Trump or NATO. In this context, the German government is first increasing its defense budget through special funds of 100 billion euros, expanding its military capacity and accelerating moves to strengthen its defense industry. At this point, the recent statements of German Chancellor Merz are highly noteworthy. On the other hand, Berlin is trying to present this capacity not as an “EU NATO” that would amount to “Regional mini-NATOs,” but rather as a capacity integrated into NATO’s main command structure and multinational divisions. The Trump administration is most likely aware of this matter; however, in order to prevent a deeper crisis or rupture within NATO and the Western alliance, it appears to be turning a blind eye to it. In the coming period, it would not be very surprising if we were to see “German Yellow Vests” in the streets and the AfD as the ruling party.
C. The Eastern Flank (Poland, Romania and the Baltic States): “Pragmatic Existentialism”
To put it clearly, institutional theories have no importance for Eastern European countries that share a direct border with Russia or feel themselves to be under first-degree threat. For these countries, the only criterion is the question of “who will provide the fastest and most effective military protection.” Therefore, they are seeking realistic solutions to their security-oriented concerns. In this context, the Baltic countries and Poland see micro-alliances woven through the United Kingdom’s JEF or the temporary task forces of the United States in the region, particularly permanent American brigades deployed in Poland, as “lifelines” against the possibility that NATO’s Article 5 may be activated late because of political debates. On the other hand, Warsaw’s approach to the idea/project within the framework of the “Polish Axis” also stands out as a search for a role in the context of “Regional NATOs.”
5. The Structural and Strategic Effects of the Process on NATO’s Future
The proliferation of regional military alliances and mini-lateral formations like mushrooms has transformative effects on NATO’s institutional genetics, operational capabilities and long-term future. These effects contain two opposite scenarios: “Functional Dynamism” and “Institutional Dissolution.”
The “Functional Dynamism and Force Multiplier Scenario” comes to the fore here in terms of “positive effects.” At the center of this scenario lies the “speed and flexibility paradigm,” which gives NATO’s crisis-management capacity an asymmetric flexibility. According to this, instead of waiting for the approval of 32 countries, “Regional mini-NATOs” eliminate the decision-making inertia that constitutes the main organization’s greatest weakness by enabling mini-blocs of 3 or 4 countries to react within hours in times of crisis.
Beyond this, within the framework of “Geographical and Functional Specialization,” each mini-lateral structure develops military capabilities suited to the nature of its own geography. For example, while the JEF specializes in the shallow waters of the North Sea and in polar climate conditions, AUKUS focuses on nuclear submarine warfare in the deep waters of the Pacific. In this way, the main NATO is relieved of the burden of having to specialize on every front, while also assuming the role of an “upper federation/umbrella organization” that coordinates regional specializations within itself.
The “Institutional Dissolution and Strategic Fragmentation Scenario,” on the other hand, comes to the fore here in terms of “positive effects.” At the center of this scenario lies the issue of the “devaluation of Article 5 (the erosion of deterrence)”. However, the prominence of regional alliances creates a perception in the international system that “each region should fend for itself” or that “only selected partners protect one another.” This situation naturally undermines the collective defense commitment and presents an image that may encourage revisionist actors to attack NATO’s weak links.
Beyond this, in the event of a large-scale and/or simultaneous crisis, serious questions arise as to which command center these units would take orders from: Mons/NATO, London/JEF or Brussels/EU. Frankly, these questions are regarded as equivalent to complete military operational chaos in the “chain of command.” A final issue in the context of the negative scenario is the possibility that this process may lead to a crisis of “protectionism” and “standardization” in the defense industry. This is seen as equivalent to the disruption of the principle of “standardization and interoperability of weapons systems” on which NATO has worked for seventy years, and as having the potential to fuel intra-alliance commercial-technological wars.
Conclusion
The process of “Regional NATO-ization” appears as a dystopian manifestation of the effort of the transatlantic and global security architecture to adapt to the multipolar reality of the twenty-first century. The process shows that the model of absolute global collective defense managed from a single center has reached the end of its life, and that a “flexible, fragmented and purpose-oriented network of niche alliances” has entered into force instead.
While the United States sees this process as a way to maintain its global leadership at lower cost, the United Kingdom is consolidating its strategic independence, and Eastern European and Baltic countries are taking refuge in these structures because of existential concerns. Canada and the institutionalist actors of continental Europe, namely Germany and France, are watching these developments with concern; however, under the pressure of geopolitical realities on the ground, they too are being forced to resort to micro-regional military solutions, such as Arctic alliances or EU rapid deployment forces. Yet how long this position can be maintained emerges as a question in its own right, since, from Europe’s perspective, “Pandora’s box” has now been opened.
In the long term, this process will not completely eliminate NATO; however, it appears likely to radically change its nature and pave the way for a gradual process of dissolution. In this context, after the “Ankara Summit,” the “New NATO” faces either the risk or the opportunity of becoming not a monolithic army that intervenes in every crisis, but rather a loose “Security Coordination Office” that ensures the communication, logistics and nuclear umbrella compatibility of “Regional NATOs” operating in different parts of the world.
This transformation may also be regarded as the fragmentation phase of globalization in the military sphere. In this context, at a time when the stones are being moved in relation to NATO as well, the cards will inevitably have to be redealt. It appears that these cards will be redealt at the Ankara Summit. Here, what is essential for the survival of the Alliance and for the future of the international system in the East-West context is the “Joker Member”, and that member is clear!
