Since the end of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany had consciously adopted the strategy of being positioned in geopolitical equations as “an economic giant and a military dwarf.” While Berlin accepted the “Monolithic/Integral NATO” umbrella as the sole legitimate framework of European security, it structurally transferred the burden of collective defense to the United States of America (U.S.). It then invested the “security dividend” it obtained in this way into domestic welfare, industrial transformation and an export model based on cheap energy supplied from Russia.
However, the structural ruptures that began with the Russia-Ukraine War and became permanent with the unpredictable “Trump Factor” in U.S. domestic politics, together with the humiliation in the Oval Office of the European Union (EU), which is an inseparable component of Germany’s “Westward Policy,” have pushed Berlin out of its comfort zone. More than that, they have once again brought to the agenda the “return to historical codes” that Germany had attempted to construct through Russia.
Indeed, Germany’s current military and diplomatic transformation has begun to be regarded as a reflection of the country’s historical geopolitical codes. In this context, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent statements and the diplomatic maneuvers that have taken concrete form during the NATO Summit process in Ankara have begun to be perceived as important signals that Germany is largely abandoning its traditional foreign policy doctrine, defined as “Transatlantic Loyalty and Institutional Conservatism.” In a more concrete and assertive formulation, it now stands before us as an open secret that Berlin is gradually implementing an unnamed “EU NATO” project by minimizing its one-sided dependence on Washington and shaping the continent’s defense architecture around its own military-industrial complex.
The fact that this multidimensional and multifaceted transformation within the German state is based not merely on a conjunctural defense reflex, but on Germany’s historical geopolitical codes (namely, its role as a “Central Country” and its pursuit of continental hegemony) carries great meaning for those who have even a modest familiarity with nineteenth- and twentieth-century political history. In other words, the concept of “Central Europe,” shaped by Bismarck in the nineteenth century and damaged between the two world wars, is today being revived in a democratic and institutional format. Because of its geographical position at the heart of the continent, Germany tends to overcome the security anxieties created by this location by making surrounding actors militarily, logistically and economically dependent on itself. There is no doubt that Merz’s moves are being regarded as an important and ambitious step toward filling the leadership vacuum that has been felt deeply after Merkel, not only in Germany but also in the EU/European context.
The “Merz Doctrine”: The Bundeswehr’s Conventional Leadership and Defense Industry Integration
Indeed, Merz’s increasingly frequent foreign policy and security statements in recent days confirm that Berlin no longer accepts being a “reluctant leader” in Europe. By pledging to raise defense spending to Cold War-era levels, such as 3.5 percent of GDP, Merz aims to turn the Federal Army, the Bundeswehr, into Europe’s largest and strongest conventional force. This strategy seeks not only to increase the number of soldiers, but also to make the German defense industry the logistical and technological heart of the continent.
Within this framework, Germany is strengthening its defense industry while also creating a strategic “center of attraction.” Through projects such as Skyshield, the European Sky Shield Initiative, Berlin is making continental countries dependent on its own technology and, under the name of “cooperation” and “NATO integration,” is building a covert “European Army/EU NATO” rather than openly declaring it, as Macron has done. Although this structure appears on paper to be tied to NATO’s chain of command, in terms of logistics, ammunition, command-and-control and multinational division structures, it is being placed on an entirely Berlin-centered backbone. While making these moves, the Merz administration avoids direct arm-wrestling with Washington; on the contrary, it uses the new global conjuncture in which the U.S. is focused on the Asia-Pacific and competition with China as a bargaining advantage.
The NATO Summit to be held in Ankara appears, in this context, to function as a diplomatic platform through which Germany will give international legitimacy to this move. By foregrounding the argument of “easing the U.S. burden in Europe,” Berlin has institutionally assumed the leadership of NATO’s European wing. The negotiations in Ankara may legalize Germany’s military presence on the Eastern Flank, meaning the Baltic-Poland line, while also bringing Berlin to the forefront as the second primary decision-making center in the alliance hierarchy after Washington.
The Re-Revision of Foreign Policy: The Balance Between Westward Policy and Eastward Policy
In parallel with its goal of becoming a continental center of gravity, Germany is radically revising, in line with its national interests, the two main axes that have shaped its foreign policy since the Second World War: Westpolitik and Ostpolitik. In this framework, the revision of Westpolitik manifests itself as “strategic autonomy” and “differentiation from the U.S.” As is known, Germany’s traditional Westpolitik involved following Washington at all costs and sanctifying Transatlantic unity. However, the Merz government analyzes the isolationist tendencies in U.S. domestic politics not as a temporary current, but as a structural American preference. As a result, it is trying to redefine German/EU foreign policy within the framework of “Strategic Autonomy.” In this context, attempts to reduce dependence on the U.S. across a broad spectrum, from financial systems to defense technologies, through new incentive decisions taken almost every day, have begun to attract considerable attention.
On the other hand, this does not mean, at least for a certain period of time, completely excluding NATO. The process here manifests itself as an effort to transform NATO from an American foreign policy instrument into a coalition among equals between the German-led European Bloc and the U.S., and to build a new balance. This effort is equivalent to keeping the EU, the most fundamental instrument of Germany’s “Westward Policy,” standing.
Undoubtedly, Ostpolitik is also being revised in this new process. Traditional German Ostpolitik, or Eastern Policy, aimed to achieve political détente through economic integration with Russia. With the collapse of this policy after 2022, Berlin shifted toward a sharp anti-Russian line, and a return to its former form does not appear likely in the near future. In this context, Merz’s revised “Eastern Policy without Russia” is moving toward a more rational, multilayered and pragmatic plane. In other words, Berlin no longer confines its Eastern policy solely within the Russian framework; rather, it places a broad Eurasian hinterland including China, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Türkiye at the center of its economic security and raw material supply chain.
This situation makes it necessary for Germany to set aside ideological tensions and impositions with the Eastern basin in order to secure global trade routes, and to develop pragmatic relations based on interests rather than values.
The Possible Effects of the “Merz Doctrine” on Relations with Global and Regional Actors
Germany’s effort to construct its own axis and become independent from the U.S. undoubtedly carries the potential to produce chain effects on established actors in the international system and on regional alliances. Germany’s expansion of its own defense industry, production of domestic alternatives and logistical binding of Europe to itself will not take long to be perceived as a threat to the U.S. geopolitical monopoly over the continent. For example, in the coming period, it would not be surprising for U.S.-German competition within NATO to become more visible through standardization processes and nuclear deterrence sharing.
Undoubtedly, Germany’s initiation of a process of return to its historical codes within the framework of the “Merz Doctrine,” and in this context its shifting of the center of continental security toward the Brussels-Berlin line, carries the risk of pushing Britain to the outer perimeter of the European security equation. In order to prevent this marginalization, London may move toward foregrounding the nuclear deterrence card and establishing bilateral military alliances with Poland and the Baltic states. In this context, the construction of the “Polish Axis” appears likely to accelerate.
There is no doubt that Germany’s re-emergence on the stage of history as a political and military giant will have its greatest geopolitical impact on Poland and the Baltic countries. Because of historical traumas, Poland approaches Berlin’s military leadership and Merz’s vision with deep suspicion. Warsaw, as one of the countries that most actively uses the “Russian threat” in its foreign policy, has also established its own regional military axis against this threat by raising its defense budget above 4 percent of GDP.
The Rise of the “Polish Axis”
Within this framework, it can be seen that centers such as Warsaw and Prague are trying to reinforce the “Polish Axis,” based on direct and bilateral security agreements with Washington, in order to balance Germany’s continental hegemony and to obtain at least partial deterrence against the Russian threat. This is equivalent to laying the foundations of a covert rivalry in Eastern Europe between the German-led Western Bloc and the American-sponsored Eastern Bloc. Therefore, the rise of the “Polish Axis,” which is equivalent to the historical security dilemma, carries significance not only in terms of breaking Germany’s power, but also in terms of a possible German-Russian cooperation and the division of the EU.
As Germany distances itself from Washington’s ideological and polarizing foreign policy line, it is expected that it will have to place its regional vision on a more rational, interest-based and pragmatic footing in its relations with Ankara and Moscow. In this context, although Germany defines Russia as “the greatest and most urgent threat to European security,” its search for independence from Washington appears likely to force it to establish a long-term and sustainable “securitized deterrence strategy” in relations with Russia.
Merz’s strategy, in the short term, is to deploy the Bundeswehr on the Eastern Flank, for example through the permanent German brigade in Lithuania, and to display strong conventional deterrence against Russia. In the long term, however, in a scenario in which the U.S. withdraws its hand from Europe, it would not be surprising for Germany to position itself as the only actor capable of negotiating a new continental security architecture with Moscow. German-Russian relations before 2014, and even before 2022, are the most concrete evidence of this. This matter is, as many of us know, pragmatist rationalism itself, based on the principle of “strong defense and controlled dialogue.”
Reactions to the “Merz Doctrine” and the “Return to Historical Codes”
The return to historical codes contains within itself two major structural limits and contradictions that are difficult to overcome. The first of these is the possibility of domestic political crises within the context of the social welfare-militarism dilemma. The enormous budgets Merz needs for this goal are eroding the country’s traditional welfare-state structure. Billions of euros cut from education, health, infrastructure and industrial incentives and transferred to the defense industry, when combined with high inflation and economic stagnation, create a deep rupture at the social base. This economic discontent feeds the two major risks I mentioned in my previous analysis (“The Fragmentation Phase of Globalization: The Phenomenon of ‘Regional NATO-ization,’ the Transformation of the Transatlantic Security Architecture and ‘Joker Membership’”): the “German Yellow Vests” and the “Rise of the AfD.”
While the “German Yellow Vests” may emerge as mass street movements led by unions and the working class that will oppose budget restrictions and militarization, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which opposes aid to Ukraine, armament and dependence on the U.S., is moving toward the center of the system by converting this social and economic crisis into votes. In the face of mainstream parties that have lost their political legitimacy, the possibility of the AfD becoming a governing partner has the potential to lock from within the geopolitical moves initiated by Berlin.
The second structural limit and contradiction in this process is directly equivalent to the revival of the “German Question.” In Europe’s historical memory, the “German Question” continues to occupy its place as the problem of keeping the continent’s largest power under control and preventing it from becoming a threat to its neighbors. Although Berlin presents its current armament moves through the discourse of being a “self-sacrificing actor serving Europe,” in capitals such as Paris, Warsaw and London, the fear of “a European defense played according to Germany’s rules” is growing internally. If Berlin fails to integrate its allies and manage risk-sharing processes transparently, the formation of new counter-alliances that will isolate Germany across the continent will become unavoidable.
In Lieu of a Conclusion: The “Return to Historical Codes” and the “Merz Doctrine” May Hit the Berlin Wall
Germany, seeing that the concept of “Transatlantic Loyalty” will not be enough to protect it, appears to have activated a revised, multipolar and independent geopolitical strategy within the framework of its own interests. The “Merz Doctrine,” which will be showcased at the Ankara NATO Summit and is equivalent to a return to historical codes, appears to aim at a Germany that has maximized its military capacity, turned its defense industry into the logistical center of the continent and established the backbone of an EU NATO independent of the U.S.
In this direction, Berlin’s redesigning of its foreign policy through rational decisions on the Western and Eastern axes makes it inevitable that it will place relations with Türkiye, and later with Russia, on a pragmatic plane. This possibility, which could change global power balances, seems likely to become one of the most important agenda items of the coming period. However, the fate of this ambitious geopolitical leap appears likely to be determined, to a large extent, not by Germany’s external military successes, but by domestic social costs and, undoubtedly, by the attitude of the U.S. and a few other actors.
Therefore, Germany’s efforts to return to its historical codes and the “Merz Doctrine” may hit the Berlin Wall. A German society that loses its social welfare has more than enough potential to transform Berlin’s grand foreign policy vision into an internal regime crisis through street movements and the AfD’s radical march toward power. As this giant at the heart of the continent returns to its historical geopolitical codes, it may face the risk of being crushed under the weight of its own internal dynamics. Hitler’s rise and the interwar period are the most concrete indications of this.
